Wednesday, 4 July 2018

Trumpflation

In the 1930's, when governments introduced tariffs on imports, the effect was to cause a further restriction of global trade, which deepened the condition of stagnation that already afflicted global economies. That meant that unemployment rose further, causing additional pressure on wages, and a further reduction in aggregate demand. Falls in aggregate demand, in conditions where prices were already falling, caused prices to fall further. Those are not the conditions that exist today, and into which Trump's Trade War is imposing additional costs, via the imposition of tariffs. 

The reason that prices were falling in the 1930's, is that after 1914, the global economy entered a crisis phase of the long wave cycle. The US was out of synch with that cycle, by about ten years, entering that phase in the late 1920's. In these crisis phases of the long wave, capital faced with relative labour shortages, and rising wages that squeeze profits, begins to develop and introduce new labour-saving technologies. These technologies reduce the value of commodities, and its this that causes prices overall to fall. By the 1930's, these new labour-saving technologies, are being rolled out to replace existing technology, and with aggregate demand stagnant that means that rather than being used to increase output levels, these new technologies simply produce the same output levels with less labour. 

It means that whilst gross output rises slowly, net output, i.e. the amount of surplus value rises quickly. Indeed, its this which eventually provides the basis for the next upswing of the long wave. By introducing tariffs in the 1930's, the effect was simply to restrict trade, and thereby cause economic activity to slow further, which put further pressure on employment, and wages. 

But, today, the global economy is in a long wave upswing that began in 1999. It was that upswing that led to sharply rising levels of employment in the early 2000's, which started to put upward pressure on wages, which began to squeeze profits, and cause interest rates to rise. For thirty years, central banks had fuelled asset prices, by reducing official interest rates, increasing liquidity, and easing credit whenever stock or property markets began to falter. Every time interest rates began to rise, for example, in 1994, it caused asset prices to tumble, because a major determinant of those asset prices is interest rates, because the price of such assets is the capitalised value of the revenue they produce. 

Because central banks had goosed asset prices for such a prolonged period, and to such an extent it meant that at every stage, after each one of these corrections 1987, 1990, 1994, 1997, 2000 the amount of liquidity required became larger and larger, and the astronomical prices of the assets became more and more detached from reality. There is a thirteen year cycle of stock market corrections going back a long way, and this cycle is connected itself to the long wave cycle, being more or less synchronous with the conjunctural phases of the cycle, and at which point underlying changes in the rate of profit, and the rate of interest occur – both of which are the basis for the determining of the capitalised value of revenue producing assets. 

The 1962 financial crash occurred, as the post- war long wave cycle moved from its Spring Phase (1949-62) to its Summer Phase (1962-74), as wages began to rise, and profits began to be squeezed. The 1974 crash came as that Summer Phase came to an end, and the Crisis Phase (1974-87) began, and interest rates rose sharply. The 1987 crash occurred, as the Crisis Phase came to an end, and the Stagnation Phase (1987-1999) got underway. The 2000 crash occurred as the new Fifth Long Wave cycle began in 1999. On this basis, the next crash should have been expected around 2013, but, in fact, it happened in 2008. The reason is that, the period of the last 30 years has been unique. In the past, whenever asset price bubbles burst, they remained burst, prices only recovering gradually. In real terms, the Dow Jones only regained the value it had prior to the 1929 crash, in the 1950's. This time, however, each time, after 1987, central banks and governments acted to reflate asset prices not just to their former levels, but way beyond them. 

In 1987, stock markets dropped overnight by 25%, but a year later they were already at higher levels. The Dow Jones, which stood at around 800 in 1980, had soared to 10,000 by 2000, a rise of 1300%, which was seven times greater than the rise in US GDP, in the same time. By continually inflating asset prices, by continually reducing official interest rates, and increasing liquidity, the authorities made those asset prices more and more susceptible to any increase in interest rates. So, when in 2007, workers across the globe began to get large pay rises, like the 14% rise that UK tanker drivers obtained that year, and firms began to respond by rising prices, and interest rates began to rise, asset prices responded violently, leading to the 2008 financial crash. 

The reason that has been different this time is also clear. The global top 0.01% now own all of their wealth in the form of fictitious capital – shares, bonds, property. Its from this wealth they obtain their power and influence. But also governments from the 1980's also began to think that wealth was simply a question of rising asset prices providing them with a magic money tree. Instead of the need to produce new value, which generates revenue, they began to think that everything could simply be paid for out of magically rising asset prices, without ever considering what it was that causes asset prices to rise, in the first place. In the same way that governments thought that things such as elderly social care could be financed by the elderly out of their magically rising house prices, so pension funds thought that pensions could be provided out of magically rising share and bond prices. And, by encouraging speculation into those assets in order to obtain the capital gains arising from these magically rising prices, they diverted resources away from the very productive activity and capital accumulation required to produce the additional value, and surplus value that could have sustainably provided the revenues to fund those things. They created a condition where to use Andy Haldane's phrase, “Capital began to eat itself.” 

But, they put themselves in a position of that of a heroin addict who is faced with a crisis, or of going cold turkey. They have tried to avoid both, by continuing to inject themselves, only to delay and intensify the crisis. The 2008 financial crisis came 5 years early, because over the previous years, central banks and governments, by continually reflating asset prices rather than allowing them to crash, have made them ever more susceptible to any rise in interest rates. The top 0.01% that comprise the dominant section of the global ruling class has sought to achieve that, because its wealth is now held exclusively in this form of fictitious capital rather than real productive capital. It has been prepared to destroy the latter, in order to keep the paper price of the former inflated. The state has tried to accommodate them in that goal. 

The policies adopted after 2008, of pumping out even more astronomical levels of liquidity, which has led to the Dow Jones trebling from its 2009 low, whilst imposing draconian measures of austerity to limit aggregate demand, have been geared to that end. All of the polices of central banks and governments have been geared to encourage financial and property speculation, and to discourage real productive investment, so as to limit the demand for labour-power, and growth of economic activity, which in 2007 led to rising interest rates and caused asset prices to crash. 

Objectively, Trump's imposition of tariffs, and the reduction in trade and economic activity that might be expected to flow from that, could be seen as just another extension of that attempt to restrict economic growth, and so enable interest rates to stay low and asset prices inflated for a while longer. Trump, in many ways, is a last gasp of what some call neoliberalsim, and what I call conservative social-democracy. 

But, the reality is that it will, and is having the opposite effect. This is not the 1930's, and the effect of tariffs today is not the same either. Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminium are nothing new. George W. Bush attempted the same thing. The effect was that it increased the cost of constant capital, for US car makers, which thereby reduced their rate of profit, whilst simultaneously increasing the costs of production, and so the price of their cars. That not only meant that US built cars became even less competitive in the global market, it meant that US consumers who bought those cars had to pay more for them. In the 1930's, with unemployment rising, the effect would be for workers to simply cut back their demand for cars, in face of the higher prices. In the 2000's, it increasingly meant that workers sought higher wages to maintain their living standard. 

So, now. As central banks and governments have tried to restrict economic activity over the last ten years, so as to reflate asset prices, employment grew slowly, and wages were restricted. But, its now clear that the global long wave boom that began in 1999, and was trapped in a hiatus after 2008, is once more asserting itself. Across the globe, 90% of economies are growing at above trend. The US has continued to enjoy above trend increases in employment that started under Obama, and has continued, though at a slightly lower rate, under Trump. 

Trump's imposition of 25% tariffs on steel and aluminium has already caused the prices of washing machines, and other such consumer goods to rise by 19%, in the US. With steadily increasing employment in the US, those US workers are still likely to buy those consumer goods, even at these higher prices, but they will now begin to demand higher wages to compensate. US consumer price inflation is already at the 2% level the Federal Reserve has as its target, and the effect of Trump's tariffs will be to cause it to rise even faster. Higher US inflation, alongside higher US wages will lead to a further squeeze on profits, and rise in interest rates, which will bring back the conditions that led to the 2008 crash with a vengeance. 

A fall in US rates of profit will not cause investment to fall in the US, because the cause of the squeeze on profits is a rise in wages, and the rise in wages is fuelling a rise in the consumption of wage goods. Every firm is then led to have to respond to the higher demand for wage goods, by increasing its output, for fear of losing market share to its competitors. The rise in investment – even if its just to employ more workers – at a time when the rate of profit is squeezed, is what causes the demand for money-capital to rise relative to its supply, which results in higher market rates of interest. 

But, higher US interest rates are also now providing the basis for a higher Dollar. A higher Dollar leads to the export of inflation to other economies who have to import commodities in Dollar denominated prices. That is already affecting a range of emerging economies, and causing them to have to raise their own official interest rates. The UK, which had seen its rising inflation moderate in recent months, as the Dollar had been falling since the Federal Reserve stopped underpinning US bond prices, has now changed course. The Pound which had been trading at over $1.40 is now trading at around $1.30, and that is having a consequent effect once more on UK inflation, especially as the renewed growth of the global economy is pushing primary product prices higher. 

The response of the EU and others in imposing retaliatory tariffs on a range of US goods is not likely to have a similar effect. Because the EU is the largest economy in the world, it can fairly easily find substitutes for the US commodities it has imposed tariffs on. That should be a lesson to the delusionary Brexiteers, who seem to think that the tiny British economy would somehow be in a better position than the US in such a situation. The actual consequence of Brexit, and tariffs imposed by the EU has been indicated not just by Airbus, Siemens, and BMW, but also now by the US's Harley Davidson, which faced with the imposition of EU tariffs has decided to shift its production out of the US. 

But, the fact remains that the global economy today, unlike the 1930's, is growing, and the pace of growth is rising. Employment is also rising, as we are in a period of extensive rather than intensive accumulation of capital. The effect of tariffs overall, rather than causing a slow down in trade and economic activity, will be to cause a rise in costs, thereby further reducing the rate of profit. Given the increasing demand for labour, and the extent of liquidity sloshing around the global economy that is likely to result in rising levels of inflation, putting further pressure on interest rates, which are likely to rise at a much faster rate than markets or central banks are currently factoring into their calculations. The rise in interest rates will bring with it the completion of the financial crash of 2008. As asset prices crash, the conditions will be created for an even greater acceleration of real productive investment, and period of economic growth.

Theories of Surplus Value, Part II, Chapter 17 - Part 6

[2. Value of the Constant Capital and Value of the Product] 


“For the sake of simplicity, when we speak of the reproduction of constant capital we shall in the first place assume that the productivity of labour, and consequently the method of production, remain the same. At a given level of production, the constant capital which has to be replaced is a definite quantity in kind. If productivity remains the same, then the value of this quantity also remains constant. If there are changes in the productivity of labour which make it possible to reproduce the same quantity, at greater or less cost, with more or less labour, then similarly changes will occur in the value of the constant capital, which will affect the surplus-product after deduction of the constant capital.” (p 473-4) 

As stated previously, this is why the value of the consumed capital has to be determined by its current reproduction cost, not its historic cost. 

“For example, supposing 20 quarters [of wheat] at £3, totalling £60, were required for sowing. If a third less labour is used to reproduce a quarter it would now cost only £2. 20 quarters have to be deducted from the product, for the sowing, as before; but their share in the value of the whole product only amounts to £40. The replacement of the same constant capital thus requires a smaller portion of value, a smaller share in kind out of the total product, although, as previously, 20 quarters have to be returned to the land as seed.” (p 474) 

Marx returns to this point in Chapter 22, in dealing with the illusion of profit arising from the use of historic pricing rather than current reproduction costs, in his critique of Ramsey.

Whatever the historic cost of the seed consumed in production, its current reproduction cost is only £2, and it is this value, not the historic cost, which is reproduced in the value of output, just as it is this value that is taken from the output value, to replace, in kind, the consumed seed.   As Marx also sets out in Chapter 22, this illusion of profit also depends upon a concept of capital, in which its circuit is M - C ... P... C` - M`.  In other words, capitalist production ends with the realisation of capital values as money.  But, as Marx describes meticulously, in Capital II, that only applies in two  cases.  Firstly, it applies only to newly invested money-capital, for example, where a new firm is established, or else where capital accumulation is occurring with the use of realised profits or borrowed capital, and only then in relation to the accumulated capital, i.e. m - c, not to M-C.  Secondly, it applies to where a firm is closing down, so that not only its commodity-capital, but also all of its productive-capital is sold and converted thereby into money.  Even in this case, it is usually the case that whilst this is the circuit for the capital of the individual capitalist, it is not true for the circuit of the capital itself, as it is often bought by some other capitalist, and its circuit continues as before.

It would require a view of capital in which production stops at the end of each circuit, that all capital is converted into money, rather than continually being reproduced and metamorphosed simultaneously into its succeeding forms.  As Marx sets out in Capital II, and returns to this point in TOSV Chapter 21, that is not a description of industrial capitalism, whereby the vast majority of capital is existing capital that is continually being reproduced.  For this existing industrial capital, as Marx describes at length, in Capital II, the circuit is rather.


Ramsey's error, which led him to believe that money profits or losses also arose from changes in prices of the constant capital, was based, as Marx outlines in Chapter 22, precisely on his use of historic prices, and the failure to recognise that the use values that comprise the constant capital, must be physically reproduced "on a like for like basis", including all of those items of constant capital that are reproduced "in kind", out of current production, and that this reproduction of those use values, occurs at their current reproduction cost, not on the basis of their historic prices!

Returning to the point made by Ricardo, in the previous section, about the value of output of a million men in a year, Marx says, if, in both nations, the million men created £100 of new value, but, in one nation, they employed £10 million of constant capital, whereas, in the other, they employed only £1 million of constant capital, then the value of output of the first would be £110 million, and of the other only £101 million. Moreover, the nation that employed the £10 million of constant capital would, undoubtedly, produce a much greater volume of output than the other nation, because some of the constant capital would be in the form of machines that increase the productivity of the labour. Although the value of the output of I is £110 million, and that of II only £101 million, therefore, when this much greater volume of output is taken into consideration, the prices of the individual commodities, produced by I will undoubtedly be lower than those of II. 

“It is true that a greater portion of the value of the product goes to the replacement of capital in nation I as compared with nation II, and therefore also a greater portion of the total product. But the total product is also much greater.” (p 474) 

That is quite apparent with manufactured commodities, Marx says, where Britain produced both a much greater volume and greater value of output than in other countries, but whose prices, for those commodities, were lower. However, it is not necessarily the same in agriculture, and the reason is the differences in the natural fertility of the soil. Marx compares Britain with Russia. At the time, there were around a third of the population employed in agriculture, in Britain, as opposed to 80% in Russia. The figures are not entirely accurate, he says, because, in Britain, there were a lot of people employed in industries related to agriculture. For example, Britain had large-scale food processing industries, whereas in Russia the processing and packaging of food was done on the farm itself. Setting that aside, and any variations resulting from Russian peasant producers selling their output below its value, however, the reason that Russian agricultural products sold at lower money prices, despite appearing to require more labour is apparent. The British agricultural producer uses more constant capital, and this raises the productivity of the labour. That is why proportionally less of the British population was employed in agriculture. So, for any given amount of agricultural output, less British labour is used than Russian labour. But, the living labour is not the only cost of production, it also includes all of the previous labour embodied in the constant capital used by the British workers. However, if the Russian soil is more fertile than the British soil, the productivity of the Russian worker becomes greater than that of the British worker, so that the value of each unit of output is less. This is also the point Marx made earlier in his analysis of long wave agricultural prices, and the time required for the investment of fixed capital to become embedded within the natural fertility of the land. 

“This would also explain the higher money price of the labourer’s wage.” (p 476) 

The worker, during the year, undertakes labour and thereby produces new value, which is embodied alongside the constant capital in a new product. The worker who produces means of subsistence consumes a portion of this new product. The capitalist who has been consuming the surplus product created in the last year, now, at the end of this year, has this surplus product replaced for them by the new value created by the worker. Finally, the workers producing means of production create a new value by their labour, and obtain means of subsistence equal to the value of their labour-power, in exchange for constant capital, whilst the capitalist producing means of production obtains means of consumption equal to the value of the surplus value produced by their workers, again in exchange for constant capital. 

“Finally, the constant capital which is consumed in the production of constant capital, in the production of machinery, raw materials and auxiliary materials, is replaced in kind or through the exchange of capital, out of the total product of the various spheres of production which produce constant capital.” (p 476) 

Tuesday, 3 July 2018

Paul Mason's Postcapitalism - A Detailed Critique - Chapter 3 (1)

Was Marx Right

Marx's Law of The Tendency for the Rate of Profit to Fall, and Crises


Paul says, 

“Marxism is both a theory of history and of crisis. As a theory of history it is superb... But, as a theory of crisis, Marxism is flawed.” (p 49) 

Actually, Marxism is not a theory of crisis. Marxism has a theory of crises, but that is not the same thing. But, even if we let that pass, what Paul should have said is that the theory of crisis, which has been presented as Marxism, is flawed. In the previous chapter, Paul set out the reason that Kondratiev found himself at the wrong end of a firing squad was that his theory contradicted the Stalinist dogma that capitalism had become absolutely reactionary, incapable of further development, and was in the process of imminent collapse. But, that has nothing to do with Marx's analysis of capitalism, or his theory of crises. 

However, the conclusion that Paul draws is absolutely correct. The catastrophist interpretations of Marx, the concepts of top-down revolutionary change, and abolition of the market, promoted by increasingly irrelevant sects that Paul and I once belonged to, paralyse current actions, and solutions, and were they to attract any support, threaten, at best, to lead today's youth once again down a dead end, and at worst could impose on them some of the horrors of the past. 

Paul says, 

“The Man himself had witnessed only one global adaptation: the upswing of the second long wave in the two decades following the 1848 revolution.” (p 50) 

But, Marx was certainly aware of previous adaptations. His analysis, after all, deals with the biggest adaptation of all, the genesis of capitalism out of feudalism; it deals with the adaptations from merchant capital, from small-scale, handicraft capitalism and manufacture to industrial capitalism, based on machine production; it deals with the transformation of small industrial capitals into big industrial capitals, whose monopoly itself forms a fetter on further capitalist production, a fetter that is “burst asunder”, by the rise of the big socialised capitals, in the form of the co-ops and joint stock companies, which carry out an “expropriation of the expropriators”. 

Marx most certainly did witness this last adaptation, as private capital gave way to socialised capital, and, with the passing of the Limited Liabilities Act, in 1855, it was an adaptation that rapidly took hold in the period after 1865. It created the basis for Marx to describe these new large socialised capitals as the transitional forms of property, between capitalism and socialism. Once again, rather a significant adaptation. 

Paul gives a summary introduction to the labour theory of value, and the determination of an average rate of profit. But, he fails to mention that this average rate of profit is inconsistent with prices determined by the labour theory of value. His statement that firms create a “discernible average rate of profit in each sector, and in the whole economy, against which they set prices and judge performance”, is also not clear. It appears to replicate the view and confusion of Ricardo. As Marx demonstrates, there is no average rate of profit within any sector, because different firms within the sector operate at different levels of efficiency. There is a single market value, or price of production, for the commodities produced in that sector, but it is precisely because each firm has to sell its output at this common price that those of them that are more efficient enjoy a higher than average rate of profit, and those that are less efficient obtain a lower than average rate of profit. Only on that basis can there be an average rate of profit for the sector as a whole, equal to the average for the economy as a whole. 

There is only an average rate of profit for the economy as a whole, and its because of that that capital moves from low profit sectors to high profit sectors, thereby bringing about changes in supply, relative to demand, in each sector, until average rates of profit are established one sector as against another. And, it is this, not, as Paul suggests, interest, which is the main mechanism for allocating capital. When Marx discusses the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, in areas where the organic composition of capital is higher than average, or the rate of turnover of capital is lower than average, and explains how this acts to reallocate capital across the economy, it is that he means when he says that it is “the most fundamental law of capitalism.” 

Paul notes that, 

“a proportion of investors begin to accept interest – rather than outright entrepreneurial profit”, 

but doesn't seem to connect this as itself being a consequence of an adaptation of capitalism, which can only arise as a consequence of the development of socialised capital, of the fact that, with the development of joint stock companies, and particularly limited liability companies, big private capital becomes exclusively money-lending capital, by which should not be understood banks and financial institutions – which are themselves socialised capitals – but the individual shareholders, bondholders and so on, and the form in which they hold their wealth is then in the form of these shares, bonds, financial instruments and property - fictitious capital - not real productive-capital. 

But, from what I have said in relation to the previous chapter, it should be clear that I believe the following argument by Paul is wrong. He says, in relation to the countervailing tendencies to Marx’s law of falling profits, 

“We must be crystal clear on this: for Marx, these counter-tendencies operate constantly. A crisis happens only when they become exhausted or break down.” (p 52-3) 

Its true that the countervailing tendencies to Marx's law of falling profits operate constantly, but the law itself does not, or, at least, it does not operate to significantly put downward pressure on the rate of profit. Marx spells it out in Capital III, Chapter 15, 

“Growth of capital, hence accumulation of capital, does not imply a fall in the rate of profit, unless it is accompanied by the aforementioned changes in the proportion of the organic constituents of capital. Now it so happens that in spite of the constant daily revolutions in the mode of production, now this and now that larger or smaller portion of the total capital continues to accumulate for certain periods on the basis of a given average proportion of those constituents, so that there is no organic change with its growth, and consequently no cause for a fall in the rate of profit. This constant expansion of capital, hence also an expansion of production, on the basis of the old method of production which goes quietly on while new methods are already being introduced at its side, is another reason, why the rate of profit does not decline as much as the total capital of society grows.” 

And, understanding this is crucial to understanding the relation of Marx's theory of profit, and of crisis, to the periodicity of the long wave. Its not Marx's law of falling profits, or the exhaustion of the countervailing tendencies that leads to crisis. Quite the opposite. It is the crisis itself which makes it necessary for capital to seek out new technological solutions. It is the fact that labour supplies are exhausted, so that no additional absolute surplus value can be produced, and which has resulted in rising wages squeezing profits, by a reduction in the rate of surplus value, which makes it necessary to develop and introduce new labour-saving machines. It is that introduction then of those machines which raises productivity, and thereby raises the proportion of processed material to labour, raising the organic composition of capital, which sets in play Marx's law of falling profits. 

It likewise brings about the desired fall in wages, as a relative surplus population is created, and as capital accumulation then proceeds on the basis of this intensive accumulation, and relatively less labour employed, economic growth slows and stagnates. The same drive to reduce costs leads to a drive for new technologies to cheapen the production of fixed capital, to make more efficient use of raw and auxiliary materials etc. This creates the basis for a reduction in the value of constant capital, significant for the next upswing. It provides the base technologies that are incorporated in the new consumer industries that are the means by which the market is expanded internally. 

For long periods, as Marx says, capital expands essentially on the basis of the existing technologies. Only organic, incremental changes are made. My Dad worked as an engineer in car factories across the Midlands, in the late 1930's/early 1940's. He told me that the lathes and milling machines he worked on in engineering shops, in the Potteries, in the 1970's, were the same as, in some cases not as advanced as, the ones he'd used thirty years earlier. 

The concept about machines replacing labour is also largely misunderstood, because Marx makes clear that this does not apply only to the actual workers who might get displaced, but also to the potential, theoretical workers who actually never existed. As described earlier, and as Marx points out, if £1,000 employs 1 worker, who produces £100 of surplus value, then, on the basis of the same technology, £3,000 of capital can employ 3 workers who produce £300 of surplus value. It may be the case that the £1,000 of capital includes a machine that enabled the 1 worker to do the work that 2 workers did previously. So, it has actually displaced a worker. Theoretically, each additional such machine displaces a worker who might otherwise have been employed. But, practically, each such new additional machine results in the employment of one additional worker who previously did not have a job. 

So, the roll-out of any such new technology, as an accumulation of capital (extensive accumulation) rather than simply a replacement of existing technology (intensive accumulation) results in an absolute increase in the mass of simultaneously employed labour, and thereby in the mass of surplus value. To the extent any such technology reduces the value of labour-power, it raises the rate of surplus value, and so again raises the mass of surplus value. To the extent it reduces the value of constant capital, it raises the rate of profit, and to the extent it increases the rate of turnover of capital, it raises the annual rate of profit. 

The problem arises not on the back of Marx's law of falling profits, but, as he sets out, on the basis that existing supplies of labour start to run out. Workers can only work a certain amount of overtime, there are only so many married women, immigrants and so on who can be brought into the workforce. So, there is a limit to how much absolute surplus value can be increased, and given the existing level of technology, it is impossible to reduce the value of labour-power, so as to increase relative surplus value. So, competition for labour pushes up wages, profits are squeezed, and crises arise.

Theories of Surplus Value, Part II, Chapter 17 - Part 5

The constant capital consumed in the production of means of consumption, represents only the revenue produced by workers in Department I, in other words, the value of the constant capital (intermediate goods) contains no value of constant capital at all. It only comprises the value produced by labour in Department I, and which is resolved into Department I wages, profits, rent and interest, which forms the value equivalent, and potential source of demand for the equivalent portion of final output, i.e. the equivalent portion of the consumption fund, produced by Department II. 

In other words, as Marx sets out in Capital II, if we take Department I and II,

Department I

c 4000 + v 1000 + s 1000 = 6000.

It supplies Department II with 2000 of constant capital, and this value is equal to the new value created by Department I workers, i.e. it is equal only to the new labour they provide.  That value is then incorporated into Department II output as constant capital.

Department II

c 2000 + v 500 = s 500 = 3000

Equally, the workers and capitalists of Department I who obtain this 2000 of value as revenue (wages, profits etc.) use it to buy consumer goods from Department II.  The other 1,000 of value produced by Department II, is likewise consumed by Department II workers and capitalists with their revenues, equal to the new value created by Department II workers.  If we looked at the National Income/GDP figures for this economy, it would show it as being 3000, which is the sum of revenues and  new value created in Department I and II.

But, as Marx has demonstrated in Capital II, III, and previously in Theories of Surplus Value, there is another portion of output value that does not constitute revenue for anyone. It is a portion of output that must go simply to physically replace, on a like for like basis, all of that material, and all of the actually worn out fixed capital, consumed in Department I itself, in the production of means of production.  It is, here, the 4000 of constant capital consumed in Department I, as part of its own production.

“This part, as we have seen, is replaced in kind either directly out of the product of these spheres of production themselves—as in the case of seeds, livestock and to a certain extent coal—or through the exchange of a portion of the products of the various spheres of production manufacturing constant capital. In this case capital is exchanged for capital.” (p 472) 

In other words, as seen previously, the farmer who grows corn, uses a portion of the corn they grow to replace the seeds that were used to grow the corn; a coal mine uses some of the coal it mines to replace the coal it burns in its steam engines, used to pump water etc. from the mine. None of this output is used for consumption. It forms no revenue for anyone; it is simply capital replacing capital. But, not all capital can be replaced by capital in this way, from within the same industry. The coal mine cannot replace the wood or steel used for pit props from its own production, or its steam engines. But, the steel producer, timber supplier and machine maker must also reproduce their constant capital in this way too, so that, in aggregate, all of the producers of means of production replace their own constant capital from their own aggregate production. 

What Ricardo, like Smith, and economists down to today, fail to take account of is that this value of the constant capital adds to the value of output, whilst forming no part of revenue, or national income. 

“The existence and consumption of this portion of constant capital increases not only the mass of products, but also the value of the annual product. The portion of the value of the annual product which equals the value of this section of the consumed constant capital, buys back in kind or withdraws from the annual product that part of it, which must replace in kind the constant capital that is consumed. For example, the value of the seed sown determines the portion of the value of the harvest (and thus the quantity of corn) which must be returned to the land, to production, as constant capital. This portion would not be reproduced without the labour newly added during the course of the year; but it is in fact produced by the labour of the year before, or past labour and—in so far as the productivity of labour remains unchanged—the value which it adds to the annual product is not the result of this year’s labour, but of that of the previous year.” (p 472-3) 

And, the fact that Marx makes this point that “in so far as the productivity of labour remains unchanged” illustrates why the value of this constant capital must be determined by its current reproduction cost, and not by its historic cost. If the value of the consumed constant capital, and, on the basis of it, the rate of profit, were simply to be calculated using the historic cost of that capital, i.e. the money price paid for it, then Marx's comment about productivity would be irrelevant, and illogical, because whatever happened with productivity, the historic cost would be unchanged by it. But, as was seen, in the previous chapter, what happens with productivity, and, therefore, with the social labour-time currently required to reproduce that consumed capital, is of decisive importance in determining what portion of production must be set aside for that purpose, what represents released or tied up capital, what then constitutes the surplus product and surplus value, and, correspondingly, what constitutes the rate of profit for the total social capital.  Indeed, if productivity were to fall dramatically, say because of a catastrophic crop failure, rather than a surplus product, a negative product might result, so that the capital itself is diminished, and in place of a surplus value, a loss arises.

 As Marx sets out shortly, 

“At a given level of production, the constant capital which has to be replaced is a definite quantity in kind. If productivity remains the same, then the value of this quantity also remains constant. If there are changes in the productivity of labour which make it possible to reproduce the same quantity, at greater or less cost, with more or less labour, then similarly changes will occur in the value of the constant capital, which will affect the surplus-product after deduction of the constant capital.” (p 473-4) 

Moreover, the greater the proportion of output that consists of constant capital, the greater the proportion of total output that must itself be consumed in the production of constant capital. In reality, this is what lies behind the rise in the organic composition of the total social capital, and thereby the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. In other words, the larger the component of the total social capital that consists of means of production that must be replaced in kind, out of that total output, the smaller the proportion of surplus product to it will become, even though the size of this surplus product will itself, as a result of this very process, and the rise in social productivity, become much larger in absolute terms. 

“If this portion [of constant capital] grows, not only does the annual mass of products grow, but also their value, even if the annual labour remains the same.” (p 473) 

This expansion in the volume of output is yet another manifestation of the real nature of the fall in the rate of profit, whilst the mass of profit expands, because what it represents is a considerably increased mass of profit, but spread out across an even more considerably increased quantity of commodities, so that the amount of profit contained in each unit, the profit margin, is thereby diminished, particularly as against its raw material content, which is, proportionally, continually increased. 

The more accumulation proceeds, and social productivity rises, the greater the value of each commodity unit comprises proportionally more raw material, whilst the proportion of fixed capital (wear and tear) and of labour (paid and unpaid) declines. And this is true of the total social production too. So, Marx says, Ricardo is wrong, when he says, 

““The labour of a million of men in manufactures, will always produce the same value, but will not always produce the same riches” (l.c., p. 320).” (p 473) 

because, with a fixed working-day, these million men will produce very different quantities of commodities, depending upon that level of social productivity, which in turn, will be determined by the amount of technological development of instruments of labour they have at their disposal. That will not change the amount of new value created by that labour, but it will mean that a greater mass of dead labour is incorporated in that larger volume of output, as it is processed by this more productive labour. The more productive the labour, the greater the level of output per unit of labour, and so the lower the proportion of the value of output will comprise the new value created, whilst the greater the proportion of the value of output will comprise the value of the raw material constituted within it. 

Monday, 2 July 2018

Theories of Surplus Value, Part II, Chapter 17 - Part 4

By contrast to the fixed capital, which has very extended lifespans, other elements of fixed capital may be worn out and need to be replaced within the year, or shorter period, similar to the circulating capital. Marx says, in relation to the constant capital that must be reproduced within the year, 

“A large part of what appears as constant capital—instruments and materials of labour—in one sphere of production, is simultaneously the product of another, parallel sphere of production. For example, yarn which forms part of the constant capital of the weaver, is the product of the spinner, and may still have been in the process of becoming yarn on the previous day. When we use the term simultaneous here, we mean produced during the same year. The same commodities in different phases pass through various spheres of production in the course of the same year.” (p 471) 

That is only because the year has been taken as the standard accounting period over which to take measurements, and to analyse the process of social reproduction. It is, in this sense, a purely artificial metric, especially given that capitalist production is a wholly continuous process. Things do not stop at the end of this yearly period, and then start again on the following day in a new year. Indeed, as Marx says here, the yarn being turned into cloth today was only yesterday cotton or flax, being turned into yarn, and today that yarn being consumed in the production of cloth is being simultaneously reproduced by the spinner. The whole nature of continuity, of flux and movement, be it the movement in production or anywhere else in the material world, necessitates the concept of simultaneity, and the dialectical contradiction it entails. 

Instead of using a year as the basic period of analysis, it would be just as valid to have chosen a month, week, day or hour, because the continuous nature of the process means the same statement could be made about any of these periods, down to the very smallest periods of time. With globalisation ensuring that social reproduction truly continues around the clock, and with ever rising rates of productivity continually reducing the working period, and rate of turnover of capital, and with Just In Time production and stock control systems, that is even more the case. 

Just consider, in the modern world, where a customer passes, every few seconds, through a supermarket checkout, the details of their purchases are sent instantaneously to a central computer system that adjusts stock control records, whilst simultaneously aggregating this data and sending orders to suppliers for replacement items, whilst those suppliers adjust their production accordingly, and send their own order to their own suppliers etc. Such integrated systems have existed now for more than 30 years. 

In the meantime, the customer at the checkout has swiped their debit or credit card through the till, so that the equivalent amount of exchange-value is deducted from their bank account, and instantly transferred to that of the store, so that the capital advanced for the production and distribution of these commodities, is turned over, in a matter of minutes, as the store in turn makes electronic payments to its suppliers for the physical reproduction and replacement of all the bought items. Compare that with the situation even fifty years ago, when workers were paid their wages each week in notes and coins. They would go along, at the end of the week, to the grocer, greengrocer and butcher to buy necessaries. They would buy what they needed, and hand over the cash. All of those shop owners would then have to go to their bank, to deposit the funds, which only then were available for them to use to make replacement purchases. 

But, before they could do that, they also had to physically stock take to total up what had been sold, and what needed to be replenished; a task I had to undertake in a range of different companies during those times. Orders to suppliers would then be made by phone or a physical visit, or by post. And this process was repeated for every stage backwards along the chain. In the 1970's, I worked for a large glaziers, and glass suppliers, and one of my weekly tasks was to climb up a ladder, to physically count every large sheet of glass, of each type, pattern and thickness, held in stock, so as to ensure that everything that had gone out could be continuously replaced on a like for like basis. 

“The same commodities which are thus consumed as constant capital in the course of the year are also, in the same way continuously being produced during the same year.” (p 491-2) 

And, as illustrated above, “during the same year” here also means during the same month, week, day, hour, minute, second, because this process of capitalist production and distribution is continuous. What is being consumed is simultaneously being produced, and what is being produced is simultaneously being consumed. 

“A machine is wearing out in sphere A. It is simultaneously being produced in sphere B. The constant capital that is consumed during a year in those spheres of production which produce the means of subsistence, is simultaneously being produced in other spheres of production, so that during the course of the year or by the end of the year it is renewed in kind. Both of them, the means of subsistence as well as this part of the constant capital, are the products of new labour employed during the year.” (p 472) 

Sunday, 1 July 2018

Paul Mason's Postcapitalism - A Detailed Critique - Chapter 2 (4)

The Long Wave Uptrend


The actual crucial conditions for the start of a new long wave uptrend are that: 
  1. The rate of surplus value has risen due to the creation of a relative surplus population, resulting from the introduction of labour-saving technologies (intensive accumulation)
  2. The increased mass of surplus value, and cheapening of fixed and circulating constant capital causes the rate of profit to have risen
  3. The higher rate of profit, and lower rate of growth (due to intensive rather than extensive accumulation), during the period of stagnation, creates an excess supply of loanable money-capital, which reduces interest rates, and promotes speculative bubbles.
  4. The new technologies introduced to reduce production costs, form the basis of new, high-profit consumer industries. Once these reach a critical mass, they create the conditions for the valorisation of existing industries, and so for a period of synchronised growth in demand
  5. On the basis of high annual rates of profit, sustained and growing aggregate demand, and the availability of cheap money-capital, productive-capital begins to accumulate at a faster pace
  6. Increased demand for raw materials causes prices to rise, as existing sources of supply are inadequate, so vast new tracts of land are opened up for agriculture, mining etc. and, in order to do so, and to raise their productivity, to that of existing areas, large scale infrastructure spending on roads, rails, ports and so on must be undertaken 
These inevitably are established on the basis of the latest technology. For example, canals in the late 18th century, railways in the mid 19th century, roads and telephones at the start of the 20th century, motorways and high speed rail, as well as aircraft etc. in the mid 20th century, and the Internet, mobile telephony, satellite communications etc. at the start of the 21st century. 

Another problem of trying to fit current events into the long wave framework, I think, also arises with Paul's explanation of the periodicity of wars and revolutions, and this is significant for his explanation of a prolonged fourth wave, or stalled fifth wave, which he doesn't seem too decided on as a definition of where we are. Rather than applying an empiricist approach to that question, I prefer to apply a logical and materialist approach. In other words, can we make a logical argument, based on material conditions, as to why, at the start of a new long wave upswing, there should be wars and revolutions. My answer is no. A condition for the upswing is that, in the previous period, workers have been heavily defeated, their organisations depleted, their confidence and morale undermined, and at the start of the new upswing, a large surplus population exists. So, when things look better, workers may begin to have confidence restored; those in employment may see real wages improve; but only after a time do they begin to rebuild their unions and other organisations etc. If there is an increase in their activity, it is channelled into Economism and distributional struggles, and a rapidly expanding capital, with high levels of surplus value, productivity and profit can easily accommodate that. 

The 1950's, for example, was a period when the Tories experienced a prolonged period in government, and a similar pattern can be seen in Europe, and the US. It's not these periods of initial rapid growth that create the conditions for revolutions, but the point at which the upswing falters. It is when, to use the scenario discussed earlier, curplus value cannot be expanded further, by extending the working-day, or increasing the number of workers employed; it is when the methods of distributional struggle that worked for 25 years, are no longer sufficient to raise wages and conditions, when capital is more inclined to resist, but when the workers are still strong, and morale is high that revolutions are likely, or at least likely to succeed. 

A successful revolution was more likely in 1871, at the time of the Paris Commune, as the 1843-1873 uptrend came to an end, than it was in 1848, when that trend commenced. It was more likely in 1917, and in the years after. 

And the same is true of wars, including the US Civil War, fought to establish a centralised state, and the 1914-18 war in Europe, continued in 1939-1945, for the same reason of establishing a centralised European state, as the rational basis for capital to operate within the continent. Even in terms of the old colonialist causes of war, for control of markets, the real pressure to do so comes at the point that profits are squeezed, not at the point, at the start of an uptrend when profits are high, and capital can simply buy the access it requires. 

I don't think that Paul's fourth wave from the late 1940's to 2008 works. It certainly does not work with a simultaneous fifth wave starting in the 1990's. Bill Jeffries, of the former Permanent Revolution group, which came out of Workers Power, which Paul formerly belonged to, has argued that the new uptrend began around 1990, and cites the fall of the Eastern Bloc as a sign of its commencement. I have argued that is wrong too. 

I have pointed to the sharp rise in primary product prices from 1999, the sharp upward break in global trade, the rise in global GDP, and fixed capital formation from that point as clear indications that the new uptrend began in 1999. For reasons I've set out elsewhere, I can see why supporters of the long wave theory, faced with 2008, and its aftermath are reluctant to accept that we are in such an uptrend, but we are. The task is to explain what happened after 2008. The fact that rather than being in some period of long depression or secular stagnation, we are once again seeing a strong and synchronised up-tick in global growth makes that task easier. But, I will deal with it in relation to Chapter 4.

Theories of Surplus Value, Part II, Chapter 17 - Part 3

As stated earlier, when Ricardo talks about this accumulation of variable capital that is the accumulation of all those commodities required as wage goods by workers, required for the reproduction of their labour-power. Ricardo, like Smith, has no conception of constant and variable-capital, and rather makes a distinction between fixed and circulating capital. Ricardo has some conception of the accumulation of fixed capital, as was seen earlier, but, like Smith, he resolves all of the value of the circulating constant capital into revenues. Yet, in order to understand the process of reproduction, the rate of profit, and the process of accumulation, it is vital to have a clear understanding of the nature of the constant capital. The reason that Smith, Ricardo and others make a distinction between fixed and circulating capital, rather than constant and variable-capital, is that the distinction is more obvious. 

The fixed capital, although it is always present, only transfers a portion of its value to production at a time. It continues to exist over several production cycles. But, the circulating capital, whether it is viewed as those commodities consumed by workers, as means of consumption, or as those commodities consumed productively by workers in the production process itself, is continually being consumed, in its entirety, and thereby needing to be continually reproduced in its entirety. 

The greater the proportion of fixed capital, the more its reproduction, in any one year, takes on a purely formal character. In other words, it gives up a portion of its value to production, as wear and tear, and this value is, therefore, withdrawn for the purpose of reproduction, but, because the factory, machine or other equipment is not actually worn out, it is not physically replaced. The reproduction is purely formal, in the sense that this corresponding value is withdrawn from circulation and set aside as a money reserve, to cover the actual reproduction, as and when the fixed capital is really worn out. Any repairs undertaken on the fixed capital are taken as being part of its original value. As Marx sets out, in Capital, for some types of fixed capital, their lifetime is so long, for example a canal, that these repairs constitute the main form of their reproduction. 

The use value of the fixed capital, as with the use value of all constant capital, is preserved by the action of labour on it. And, where labour does not act upon constant capital, to preserve this use value, the constant capital suffers deterioration not through wear and tear, but through depreciation, which results not only in a reduction in its use value, but also its value. Even if the passage of time does not result in an actual deterioration of the fixed capital, this depreciation is manifest in its moral depreciation, as technological development introduces newer, better machines, and rising social productivity continually reduces the value of the existing fixed capital stock.