Anti-Duhring, Part III – Socialism, II – Theoretical - Part 14

The role of the boards of Directors, is to represent the interests of shareholders, not the company. As set out before, shareholders, as owners of interest-bearing capital/fictitious capital, seek to maximise their revenue in the form of interest/dividends. The interest of the company, however, is to maximise its profit of enterprise/retained profit, and so to minimise all other deduction from profit, such as rent, interest/dividends and taxes.

A company that simply borrows money from a bank, or in the bond market, pays only the going, competitive rate of interest on the money it borrows, though, as Marx describes, the worker cooperatives always found they were charged higher rates of interest. But, precisely because shareholders have control over companies, and appoint the boards of directors that set the dividend payments, they are able to pay themselves more than any such competitive market rate of interest. The consequence is that, where a company agrees a higher dividend pay-out, other owners of loanable money-capital seek to obtain it. By buying the company's shares. That causes the market price of those share to rise, and consequently the dividend yield (dividend/share price) to fall back towards the average.

But, in the same way, the speculative money that flows towards these shares flows away from other shares (and other speculative assets). The market price of those shares/assets then would fall, and so on. Speculative money moving to buy shares would cause bond prices, property prices etc., to fall, with a corresponding rise in bond yields, rental yields and so on.

Shareholders, therefore, simply by assigning to themselves a larger amount of interest/dividends than would represent a competitive market rate of interest, bring about changes in all asset prices and yields. But, as Marx sets out in Capital III, Chapter 23, it is still constrained by the laws of capital.

“It would be still more absurd to presume that capital would yield interest on the basis of capitalist production without performing any productive function, i.e., without creating surplus-value, of which interest is just a part; that the capitalist mode of production would run its course without capitalist production. If an untowardly large section of capitalists were to convert their capital into money-capital, the result would be a frightful depreciation of money-capital and a frightful fall in the rate of interest; many would at once face the impossibility of living on their interest, and would hence be compelled to reconvert into industrial capitalists.”

Shareholders cannot simply continue to pay themselves more out of profits as interest/dividends. On the one hand, the process described above creates a vicious circle. Dividend/interest payments rise, asset prices rise, yields fall, but, also, if more and more profit is simply shelled out as dividends/interest, less is available as profit of enterprise/retained profit, so, at some point, the actual industrial capital that creates the profit out of which that interest is paid does not grow. If industrial capital does not grow, i.e. if the social relation it represents does not expand, so that more labour is exploited, surplus value does not grow, and so the profit out of which all those revenues (interest/dividends, rents, taxes and profit of enterprise) are taken does not grow.

It is those laws of capital that have imposed themselves on the ruling-class over the last thirty years. They, also, found nuance, reflection and contradiction in the political sphere. The drawing of ever greater interest/dividends from profits, in the old imperialist state, showed up as deindustrialisation and asset stripping, but the other side of that was a combined and uneven development of large-scale industrial capital in China/Asia, Latin America, and later Africa. The globalisation of production, of which this was part, itself facilitated the continuation of the delusion in the West. It reduced unit costs, and facilitated trade, raising profits. In the same way that Britain, in the 19th century, used its surplus money profits to provide credit to those countries that used it to buy British exports, so China and other countries, now, ploughed money into western credit markets. They loaned money to he US, buying US bonds and so on, pushing up their price and reducing yields.

In the West, the US and UK in particular, the process of deindustrialisation led to a resurrection of the petty-bourgeoisie. It is most noticeable in the UK where, since the 1980's, it has grown by 50%. Napoleon called Britain a nation of shopkeepers, but, since the 1980's, it has been a nation of precarious, self-employed traders, symbolised by “white van man”. That includes those traders involved in the growing trade in illicit substances, home-made porn etc. The majority of adverts on Youtube etc., now assume that their audience are all involved in some kind of small business activity.

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Anti-Duhring, Part III – Socialism, II – Theoretical - Part 13

This introduces a further contradiction, which is obscured by the fact that, other than in the worker-cooperative, control over the socialised capital is exercised, not by its collective owners (the associated producers, i.e. the workers), but by a section of its creditors, i.e. the shareholders. That is true of a consumer cooperative and a nationalised industry, just as much as with a limited company. Indeed, with nationalised companies, the state, although the only shareholder, itself obtains the money-capital by borrowing on the bond markets, giving the private owners of fictitious capital an indirect influence on those companies.

Similarly, the Directors of those companies are appointed to represent the interest of the state as shareholder/creditor, and not the interests of the company – let alone its workers, as the real collective owners of it. It is no surprise, then, when the state appoints the very same Directors that circulate around the boards of limited companies, to carry out that role.

Marx points out that, in relation to the joint-stock companies, the revenues (new value created) resolve into wages, rent, interest and profit of enterprise, as with all industrial capitals. But, the fact that these companies employ professional managers, who act as “functioning capitalists”, means that the actual payments do not coincide with these revenues. A part of what is actually profit of enterprise/retained profit, which should be available for capital accumulation, as the property of the company, instead appears as “wages” for some of the company Directors, and, also, appears as “interest/dividends” to shareholders.

In these socialised capitals, the professional managers, or “functioning capitalists”, i.e. those that perform the functions of entrepreneur, by bringing together the factors of production efficiently, exercising day to day control over production, distribution, sales and marketing, etc., are drawn from the working-class, which is why this industrial capital, in its imperialist phase, requires an extension of “free” public education, to ensure the supply of this managerial/administrative/scientific/technical labour-power. Again, these welfarist concepts, associated with social-democracy, mushroomed from the latter part of the 19th century.

“The general relaxation of conventional barriers, the increased facilities of education tend to bring down the wages of skilled labour instead of raising those of the unskilled." (J. St. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 2nd ed., London, 1849, I, p. 479.)”

(Capital III, Chapter 23, Note 79, p 389)

As Marx sets out, these actual functioning capitalists/professional managers etc., who are the personification of this socialised capital, are not to be confused with the Directors and CEO's, CIO's etc., that are set in place by shareholders to sit above them. For these Boards, as representatives of the shareholders, the actual functioning capitalists, are a potential threat to the interest payments and fictitious wealth of the ruling-class/shareholders.

“On the basis of capitalist production a new swindle develops in stock enterprises with respect to wages of management, in that boards of numerous managers or directors are placed above the actual director, for whom supervision and management serve only as a pretext to plunder the stockholders and amass wealth. Very curious details concerning this are to be found in The City or the Physiology of London Business; with Sketches on Change, and the Coffee Houses, London, 1845.

'What bankers and merchants gain by the direction of eight or nine different companies, may be seen from the following illustration: The private balance sheet of Mr. Timothy Abraham Curtis, presented to the Court of Bankruptcy when that gentleman failed, exhibited a sample of the income netted from directorship ... between £800 and £900 a year. Mr. Curtis having been associated with the Courts of the Bank of England, and the East India House, it was considered quite a plum for a public company to acquire his services in the boardroom' (pp. 81, 82).

The remuneration of the directors of such companies for each weekly meeting is at least one guinea. The proceedings of the Court of Bankruptcy show that these wages of supervision were, as a rule, inversely proportional to the actual supervision performed by these nominal directors.”

(ibid)

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Anti-Duhring, Part III – Socialism, II – Theoretical - Part 12

In other words, the accumulated stock of fixed capital has assumed mammoth proportions. Any large scale technological revolution that causes a significant moral depreciation of fixed capital brings about a big capital loss for the owners of that fixed capital. At the same time, however, this same fact of the mammoth scale of the fixed capital, relative to the circulating capital, means that, each year, as the fixed capital reduces in value – not from depreciation but from wear and tear – it brings about a corresponding rise in the rate of profit, for the firms using this existing fixed capital.

Large-scale socialised capital, therefore, has an interest in ensuring that this fixed capital can be fully and continuously employed, over a long duration, so that it recover its value in wear and tear, as quickly as possible. So, this socialised capital, whether controlled by workers or shareholders, requires the kind of long-term planning, and attempts to achieve stability, that social-democracy represents. As Engels put it in the Critique of The Erfurt Programme,

“I am familiar with capitalist production as a social form, or an economic phase; capitalist private production being a phenomenon which in one form or another is encountered in that phase. What is capitalist private production? Production by separate entrepreneurs, which is increasingly becoming an exception. Capitalist production by joint-stock companies is no longer private production but production on behalf of many associated people. And when we pass on from joint-stock companies to trusts, which dominate and monopolise whole branches of industry, this puts an end not only to private production but also to planlessness.”

The position of shareholders is, then, typically contradictory. Like the private industrial capitalists, and unlike the workers, they only see a justification in the introduction of machines/technology, where the cost is lower than the wages saved. But, like the worker and unlike the private industrial capitalist, they see the need to plan production, and, via the capitalist state, the economy so as to avoid crises. Publicly, of course, they proclaim their belief in the free market, and opposition to central planning, except, of course, when it comes to the central planning done by central banks, and their belief that such institutions can control the price of capital! In the heyday of imperialist capital in the 1930's to the mid 1970's, the ruling class made no secret of their corporatist belief in such economic planning.

As owners of fictitious-capital, (interest-bearing capital, i.e. shares, bonds etc.) shareholders stand in a contradictory and antagonistic relation to the owners of industrial capital, be they private industrial capitalists or the workers/associated producers as collective owners of socialised capital (again be it in the form of a cooperative, joint stock company/corporation etc.) As Marx notes in Capital III, Chapter 23,

“It is indeed only the separation of capitalists into money-capitalists and industrial capitalists that transforms a portion of the profit into interest, that generally creates the category of interest; and it is only the competition between these two kinds of capitalists which creates the rate of interest...

“The lending capitalist as such faces the capitalist performing his actual function in the process of reproduction, not the wage-worker, who, precisely under capitalist production, is expropriated of the means of production. Interest-bearing capital is capital as property as distinct from capital as a function. But so long as capital does not perform its function, it does not exploit labourers and does not come into opposition to labour.

On the other hand, profit of enterprise is not related as an opposite to wage-labour, but only to interest.”

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SNNS 62

 

Northern Soul Classics - Hungry For Love - The San Remo Strings

 

Anti-Duhring, Part III – Socialism, II – Theoretical - Part 11

Even within the laws of capital, however, it can be seen how, if workers exercised control over their collective property/socialised capital, this would be modified. Marx and Engels explain, in Capital III, Chapter 15, that the private industrial capitalists only introduce machines where the cost of the machine is less than the wages they save from its introduction. If the new value created by labour is, say, equal to £100, but resolves into £20 wages and £80 profit, the machine must cost less than £20.

Marx and Engels note that, in the worker cooperatives, this is not the case. For the worker, the criterion for introducing a new machine/technology is only that its value is less than the labour-time it saves. If an hour's labour is equal to £10, so that the £100 of new value, above, is equal to 10 hours of labour, a machine can be introduced if its value is less than £100. This is the difference between the private cost of production, and social cost of production, which is the basis of profit. The social cost of production of the commodity is £100/10 hours labour, but its private cost of production for the capitalist is only what he pays in wages, i.e. £20/2 hours labour.

For society, anything that reduces the social cost of production is an advantage, but it does not appear that way to the private capitalist. So, rather than waiting until a crisis of overproduction of capital arises, before engaging in innovation, a cooperative commonwealth would, from the start, have an incentive to be continually innovating, so as to reduce the burden of labour, raise productivity, and, thereby, increase real social wealth. Marx points out that that was seen in the Lancashire textile cooperatives, and Connolly noted the same with the agricultural cooperative at Ralahine.

What is true of the worker cooperative is, also, true of the other forms of socialised capital. In the joint-stock company/corporation, the workers within it, as the collective owners of that capital, have the same motivation for innovation as those in the worker cooperative. The difference is that the ruling-class deny that right to them, deny them the right to control their own collective property and, instead, place it in the hands of shareholders, whose interests are quite different. Shareholders see things in the same way as the private industrial capitalist, in so far as the use of machines/technology is concerned, but, as the size of fixed capital has become so astronomical, also, understand that the investment time-horizon has become significantly extended.

Marx, also, refers to this in, Theories of Surplus Value, Chapter 23.

“Thus there can be no doubt that in the case of all capitals employing a great deal of fixed capital—provided the scale of production remains unchanged—the rate of profit must rise in proportion as the value of the machinery, the fixed capital, declines annually, because wear and tear has already been taken into account. If the coal producer sells his coal at the same price throughout the ten years, then his rate of profit must be higher in the second year than it was in the first and so forth...

“This extra profit may be equalised also as a result of the fact that—apart from wear and tear—the value of fixed capital falls in the course of time, because it has to compete with new, more recently invented, better machinery. On the other hand this rising rate of profit, which results naturally from wear and tear, makes it possible for the declining value of the fixed capital to compete with newer, better machinery, the full value of which has still to be taken into account. Finally, the coal producer sold his coal more cheaply [at the end of the second year], on the basis of the following calculation: 50 on 100 means 50 per cent profit, 50 per cent on 95 comes to 47½ ; if therefore he sold the same quantity of coal [not for 105 but] for 102½—then he would have sold it more cheaply than the man whose machinery, for example, began to operate only in the current year. Large installations of fixed capital presuppose possession of large amounts of capital. And since these big owners of capital dominate the market, it appears that only for this reason their enterprises yield surplus profit (rent). In the case of agriculture, this rent derives from working relatively fertile land, but here we are dealing with a case where relatively cheaper machinery is utilised.}”

(Theories of Surplus Value, Chapter 23, p 388-389)

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Anti-Duhring, Part III – Socialism, II – Theoretical - Part 10

With privately owned industrial capital, such conditions enable the capitalists to gradually expand their business. They expand, at first, by replacing their older machines, as they wear out, with the newer, more productive, machines/technology. That is intensive accumulation, and leads to rising levels of productivity and rates of profit. In addition, the existence of cheap labour-power, and low rates of interest encourages new entrepreneurs to chance their arm, often in new types of production.

Over time, the majority of the old machines/technology, gets replaced by the new machines/technology, so that the rise in productivity slows down. To increase production, now, each firm must not juts replace the worn out machines, but invest in additional machines, and additional workers to operate them. This is now extensive accumulation. The demand for labour rises until again a relative shortage is created, wages rise – itself leading to a more rapid rise in the demand for wage goods, and consequently in aggregate demand, as firms scrabble to capture their share of the growing market – and, eventually, profits are squeezed.

More of the profit must be retained for accumulation, proportionally less is thrown into the money market, and, indeed, firms must enter the money market, themselves, to borrow. They must take out bank loans, issue bonds and debentures etc. The demand for loanable money-capital relative to its supply rises, interest rates rise, asset prices fall.

Eventually, wages rise to a level where a new crisis of overproduction of capital relative to labour arises. The rate of profit drops sharply. The less efficient firms cannot even make profit. They must borrow now, not to invest but simply to pay their bills. The rate of interest reaches its highest level. They go bust and lay off their workers so that a surplus of capital is now accompanied by a surplus of labour. The firms and their workers no longer appear in the market as consumers of commodities. There is under-consumption, so that there is now an overproduction of commodities, as well as capital and labour. The cycle begins again.

To overcome the overproduction of capital, capital, as a whole, engages in a new technological revolution. Productivity and profits, and the rate of profit rise. The long-wave cycle, now witnessed five times, applies, also, to socialised capitals. A new, long-wave uptrend began around 1890, as socialised capital began to supplant the monopoly of private capital. During this period, after 1890, we also see the rapid expansion of the organised labour movement, on the basis of social-democracy.

It is, of course, in workers' interest, as Marx sets out in Wage-Labour and Capital, for capital to continue to accumulate, because it is under those conditions that the demand for labour is high, and so wages rise. As, objectively, the collective owners of that socialised capital, they have every reason to want to ensure such continued expansion. But, so long as those means of production exist as capital, so long as production and distribution is determined by the market, by exchange-value, rather than use-value, the same laws of capital will continue to repeat this cycle.

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