Sunday, 15 November 2026

Anti-Duhring, Part III – Socialism, II – Theoretical - Part 33

At a time when the scale of production had burst through the fetters of the nation state, and required the creation of ever larger multinational states, this petty-bourgeois reaction demanded Brexit border controls, and when that inevitably, also, failed that reactionary dynamic meant an even greater historical reversion, leading to demands to break up even existing nation states.

The chickens of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist and Sismondist ideology of “the Left” came home to roost with a vengeance, but it has remained unable to free itself from that ideology. Engels, also, notes that there was nothing inherently socialist about the demand for nationalisation by the capitalist state. It was simply that at a certain point in the scale and development of socialised capital, it becomes inevitable, and only on that basis progressive.

“I say is constrained to. For it is only when the means of production or communication have actually outgrown direction by joint-stock companies, and, therefore, their nationalization has become economically inevitable — it is only then that this nationalization, even when carried out by the state of today — represents an economic advance, the attainment of another preliminary step towards the seizure of all the productive forces by society itself. But, since Bismarck became keen on nationalizing, a certain spurious socialism has recently made its appearance – here and there even degenerating into a kind of flunkeyism - that without more ado declares all nationalization, even the Bismarckian kind, to be socialistic. To be sure, if the nationalization of the tobacco trade were socialistic, Napoleon and Metternich would rank among the founders of socialism. If the Belgian state, for quite ordinary political and financial reasons, constructed its own main railway lines, if Bismarck, without any economic compulsion, nationalized the main Prussian railway lines simply in order to be the better able to organize and use them in face of war, in order to train the railway officials as the government's voting cattle, and especially in order to secure a new source of revenue independent of parliamentary votes, such actions were in no sense socialistic measures, whether direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious. Otherwise, the Royal Maritime Company, the Royal Porcelain Manufacture, and even the regimental tailors of the army would also be socialistic institutions [or even, as was seriously proposed by a sly dog in the thirties during the reign of Frederick William III, the nationalization of the brothels].” (Note *, p 359)

In the 1980's, for all those that had forgotten this ABC of Marxism, they were given a sharp reminder. As capital was overproduced, relative to labour supply, relative wages rose, relative profits fell. Rather than being the vehicle by which this crisis led to a rational solution, based on a transition to Socialism, the capitalist state, and the nationalised industries it controlled, became the main weapon in attacking the working-class. The bosses of those nationalised industries, appointed by the capitalist state, as their sole shareholders, were, of course, the same bosses who the day before, and the day after, were the bosses of the large corporations. In Britain, Michael Edwards at British Leyland, Iain McGregor at the National Coal Board, and so on, used the full force of the capitalist state, both its financial might, and its armed might, to defeat the strikes of the workers whose collective property they insisted be controlled by the state.

“If the crises revealed the bourgeoisie's incapacity to continue to administer the modern productive forces, the conversion of the large production and communication establishments into joint-stock companies [trusts] and state property shows that the bourgeoisie can be dispensed with for this purpose. All the social functions of the capitalist are now conducted by salaried employees. The capitalist no longer has any social activity save the pocketing of revenues, the clipping of coupons, and gambling on the Stock Exchange, where the different capitalists fleece each other of their capital. Just as at first the capitalist mode of production displaced the workers, so, now it is displacing the capitalists, relegating them, just as it did the workers, to the superfluous population, although not immediately to the industrial reserve army.” (p 359-60)

Friday, 13 November 2026

Burnham's Dead Cat Bounce - Part 9 - Burnham Facing Reality In The Era of The Gamblers, (1) When The Chips Are Down

Part 9 - Burnham Facing Reality In The Era of The Gamblers, (1) When The Chips Are Down


In the last few days, the news has been full of reports of the fall in the price of Nvidia shares, much of which has centred around the sexual affairs of its CEO, Jensen Huang. The CEO sits atop that pyramid of Directors, appointed by shareholders, to represent their interests, as against the company interest, by maximising shareholder value. So, its no wonder that the news reports, representing, themselves, the interests and views – the ruling ideas of the age – of that ruling class of speculators/gamblers, have expressed alarm at the fall in the price of the shares, especially as it ties into a renewed concern about the likelihood of astronomically inflated asset prices facing another crash, centred around a few large tech stocks, and chip makers like Nvidia.

But, those news reports, also, have presented the fall in the share price of Nvidia as being a fall in the value of the company itself. In other words, the idea that it is fictitious-capital that is “real capital”, whereas the actual real capital, the industrial capital which produces surplus-value and profits, is simply a collection of things to be managed. That is not true, as Marx set out long ago. Its not the company that has lost money or value, as a result of the fall in its share price. It has exactly the same money in its bank account it had before. The value of the components of its industrial capital – the buildings, machines, materials, and workforce – are completely unchanged.

The losers are only the shareholders, whose shares, if they sold them, would be worth less. It is only their inflated paper wealth that has been reduced, not the value of the company. Indeed, whilst the existing shareholders would lose out, if they sold their shares, today, the new buyers of those shares would, equally, be the beneficiaries. If the bank that loaned you money to buy your house, went bust, it would not change the value of your house, or its use-value. Another lender would buy up its business on the cheap, and you would just pay your mortgage payments to them.

As Marx put it,

“As regards the fall in the purely nominal capital, State bonds, shares etc.—in so far as it does not lead to the bankruptcy of the state or of the share company, or to the complete stoppage of reproduction through undermining the credit of the industrial capitalists who hold such securities—it amounts only to the transfer of wealth from one hand to another and will, on the whole, act favourably upon reproduction, since the parvenus into whose hands these stocks or shares fall cheaply, are mostly more enterprising than their former owners.”

(Theories Of Surplus Value, Part 2, p 496)

Its only insofar as companies, also, buy the shares of other companies that a fall in share prices would affect them, as a shareholder, like any other. If the current share price of company A, drops by 50%, then, if it seeks to raise additional money-capital, via a share issue, it would have to issue twice as many shares, compared to prior to the fall, to raise any given amount of money. If the amount of dividend per share remained the same that would be equal to a doubling of the yield on those additional shares. It sums up the delicious nature of the problems of the ruling-class of gamblers/coupon clippers, and of conservative social-democracy as their representative, in seeking to both have their cake and eat it.

On the one hand, they want to have higher yields on their financial and property assets, but, now, those higher yields can only come from a fall in the price of their assets, i.e. share, bond and property market crashes, upon which their whole paper wealth, and the ideology of conservative social-democracy (neoliberalism) has been built in the last 40 years.

Thursday, 12 November 2026

Anti-Duhring, Part III – Socialism, II – Theoretical - Part 32

As I predicted would happen, the surge in liquidity created during lockdowns – precisely at a time when output was deliberately and administratively reduced as government policy, and so where less currency should have been thrown into circulation – led to the high levels of commodity price inflation that occurred when lockdowns were ended, and so those depreciated money tokens flooded into the market. So, the idea that the government could just print money tokens, and, then, spend them has numerous problems.

Firstly, it depends what the government spends those money tokens on. It is only if it spends them on things that actually create new value, and which, then contribute to the economy via exchange that it would increase growth, rather than just be inflationary. Military, spending, for example, would just be inflationary. Spending on welfare benefits would similarly be inflationary.

But, as noted earlier, even if the government could direct these money tokens into value creating activity, for example, repairing crumbling roads, which can be accomplished quickly, it would take around 18-24 months before this becomes manifest, and during all that time, the government would face attack from the capitalist media, pointing to a falling Pound, rising interest rates and prices, and falling stock, bond and property markets.

If, however, the working-class, collectively, controlled the money in its pension funds, some of that could be avoided. The working-class could directly fund capital accumulation in cooperative production. Directly elected supervisory boards of workers, controlling their own pension funds, would make long-term decisions based on heir own interests for employment and economic security, rather than the short-term interest of the ruling-class speculators in inflating asset prices.

For that very reason, the ruling-class will resist tooth and nail allowing the working-class to democratically control its own money and property. Still less will they allow workers to exercise democratic control over their own collective property in the joint stock companies/corporations. For that very reason, the statist, social-democratic demands for nationalisation are not only utopian and reactionary, in the era of global imperialism, they act as a distraction and a misdirection of workers. In the era of global imperialism, nationalisation, i.e. control of socialised capital by the capitalist nation state, is utopian and reactionary. It requires, at least, statisation by a much larger, multinational state, for example, the EU.

But, the idea that even such statisation represents control by workers is a dangerous delusion, as Marx and Engels describe. It represents only a more centralised and effective control of the workers' collective capital, as a means of depriving the workers of that control.

The ruling class, as a class of owners of fictitious-capital, have, therefore, become a fetter on the further development of capital itself, just as previously, the monopoly ownership of private industrial capital, in the 19th century, had become a fetter on its development, and was burst asunder, as those private industrial capitalists were expropriated by large-scale socialised capital.

“In one way or another, with trusts or without, the state, the official representative of capitalist society, is [finally] constrained to take over the direction of production. This necessity for conversion into state property first appears in the big communication organizations: the postal service, telegraphs and railways.” (p 358-9)

But, as noted above, it is an indication of the overripe conditions, and failure of the labour movement to assert its rightful democratic control over its own collective property, itself a result of the failure of its political leadership to address that property question, which means that the era of “nationalisation” has, now, also, been eclipsed by history. In the early 1980's, as the era of social-democracy peaked, its failure to address that property question and carry through to the rational conclusion the proposals for industrial democracy, led to it being rolled back. It was not just the usual to and fro between a more progressive social-democracy and conservative social-democracy, but a dynamic in which social-democracy as a whole, ate itself and a growing petty-bourgeois mass asserted itself by utilising its numbers, at the polls, to turn the clock backwards 200 years.


Wednesday, 11 November 2026

Burnham's Dead Cat Bounce - Part 8 - (Digression) The Era of Speculation and Gambling (5) – Capital, Profit and Capital Gain (Concluded)

Part 8 - (Digression) The Era of Speculation and Gambling (5) – Capital, Profit and Capital Gain (Concluded)


Money is simply the universal equivalent form of value, a way of expressing the value of all other commodities in the form of one single commodity, rather than in labour hours. It is why money is not the same thing as money-tokens/currency/credit money. Money is always potentially capital – Marx calls capital money raised to a higher power – but not all money is capital. Money and money-capital are two different things, just as money and money tokens (currency) are two different things.

Money only becomes money-capital when it is used to replace or accumulate industrial capital, i.e. when it enters the circuit of industrial capital, and so expands the mass of surplus-value/profit. Most money-capital is simply the money-form of the value of the consumed productive-capital, realised in exchange, and thrown back into circulation to replace that consumed productive-capital (C-M-C). Most of the additional money-capital, similarly, is simply the money form of the surplus-product/surplus-value/industrial profit, created in that production, and thrown back into circulation to accumulate capital (c-m-c). In Capital II, Marx sets this out in his diagrams of the expanded form of the circuit of industrial capital.



Of course, you would not know this is the case, because bourgeois economics, and ideology promotes the myth that all of this money-capital, somehow, is thrown into circulation, from outside, by banks, shareholders and so on, without questioning where they acquired it from in the first place. Its like some kind of cornucopia that keeps magically filling their pockets with money. But, the reality is that the money that banks lend, the money that bond and shareholders lend, itself came from the payment of interest/dividends to them, and that interest/dividend was only possible because real capital produced surplus-value/profit. Some, of course, comes from savings, mostly, itself from companies that throw their unused money reserves into the capital markets, so as to not have the money lying sterile.

Profit is the money form of the surplus product. But, as stated earlier, this money profit is, then, divided. Some is appropriated as rent by landlords, some as taxes by the capitalist state, some as interest by lenders of money-capital, and only what is left is profit of enterprise/retained profit. In the era of the monopoly of private capital, the industrial capitalist owner had to use some of the retained profit for their own personal consumption, be it of necessaries or, increasingly, luxuries. Only what was left after that could they use as money-capital to expand the business.

Some of the revenue of the private industrial capitalist did, indeed, constitute wages for their labour in organising production, but a growing part of it simply reflected their role in policing and exploiting the labour of the workers. In the worker cooperative, this latter function disappears. If workers exercised control of their collective property in the corporations, it would, likewise disappear. The professional day to day managers would simply perform the function of conducting the labour process and be paid wages accordingly.

But, it is also to ensure that those day to day managers – especially as they are drawn from the working-class, and form unions etc. - do not assume solely that function that the ruling-class creates tiers of Directors above them, whose role is to promote the interests of the shareholder – shareholder value as even bourgeois commentators describe it – rather than the interests of the company itself.

It is this interest, the interests of the shareholders, of fictitious-capital, of the ruling-class and its state that conservative social-democracy represents, and has tried to protect. By contrast, progressive social democracy, in its own confused manner, represents the interests of the real industrial capital itself, as refracted through the lens of that layer of professional day to day managers. The latter had its heyday in the period after WWII (1945-74), but its inherent contradiction, in seeing the interests of capital and labour as compatible and negotiable, meant it would ultimately fail.

Marx described socialised capital as the transitional form of property between capitalism and socialism. Social-democracy is the appropriate transitional political regime that goes with it, but, at some point, the transition must end, the limits are reached and become a fetter that must be burst asunder. Social-democracy, even in its progressive form, cannot reconcile itself with that, and that is why the politics of a Corbyn, Benn, Sanders, Melonchon, let alone of a Burnham, even given its most generous evaluation, will quickly run up against reality.


Tuesday, 10 November 2026

Anti-Duhring, Part III – Socialism, II – Theoretical - Part 31

But, those conditions ended, in the mid-1970's, precisely because the economic expansion no longer created the sufficiently rising profits to facilitate the rising payments of interest. Interest rates rose, but the mass of interest grew more slowly than before, because the amount of profit grew more slowly, as capital accumulation slowed, and more of that profit was required for capital accumulation/profit of enterprise, leaving less for interest payments, rents and taxes. Capital was overproduced relative to labour supply/social working-day, so relative wages rose, relative profits fell.

In the 1950's and 60's, it was not that interest rates/dividend yields rose, as the basis of the ruling class revenues rising, on the contrary, interest rates and dividend yields were falling. The increased revenues came from a rapidly growing mass of profit, as capital expanded rapidly, during the post-war, long-wave uptrend. Similarly, in the mid-60's, and through to the mid-80's, interest rates rose, precisely because capital grew faster than labour supply/social working-day. Wage share/relative wages rose. Workers used those higher wages to demand more wage goods, and some of what had previously been luxury goods, as Marx describes in Capital II, and elsewhere, always happens in these conditions.

Competition, then, forced firms to respond to that higher demand, for fear of missing out, and losing market share. As Marx pointed out in response to Ricardo, capital does not need higher rates of profits or prices to get it to do that, competition forces it to do so, even as the consequence is a lower rate of profit, because, the alternative if to lose out in the competitive struggle.

“... the extension of cultivation to larger areas — aside from the case just mentioned, in which recourse must be had to soil inferior than that cultivated hitherto — to the various kinds of soil from A to D, thus, for instance, the cultivation of larger tracts of B and C does not by any means presuppose a previous rise in grain prices any more than the preceding annual expansion of cotton spinning, for instance, requires a constant rise in yarn prices. Although considerable rise or fall in market-prices affects the volume of production, regardless of it there is in agriculture (just as in all other capitalistically operated lines of production) nevertheless a continuous relative over-production, in itself identical with accumulation, even at those average prices whose level has neither a retarding nor exceptionally stimulating effect on production.

The demand increases constantly, and, in anticipation of this new capital is continually invested in new land, although this varies with the circumstances for different agricultural products. It is the formation of new capitals which in itself brings this about. But so far as the individual capitalist is concerned, he measures the volume of his production by that of his available capital, to the extent that he can still control it himself. His aim is to capture as big a portion as possible of the market. Should there be any over-production, he will not take the blame upon himself, but places it upon his competitors.”


Marx explains the process, also, in Value, Price & Profit, where he shows that a rise in relative wages, does not cause higher prices/inflation, but shifts capital towards the production of wage goods, and away from the production of luxury goods. To increase supply of wage goods, firms employed more workers, bought more machines, materials and premises, even though those higher relative wages meant lower relative profits. The higher demand for all these Department I (producer) goods, also, then, meant Department I had to increase its output, accumulate additional capital. Capital, as a whole, therefore, was forced to expand, but, in conditions where its expansion, now, created an even greater relative shortage of labour, rising wage share and squeezed profits. A greater proportion of those profits, therefore, now had to go to funding capital accumulation, rather than the payment of interest/dividends. So, interest rates rose.

By the mid 1970's, the ruling-class and its media were complaining about the problem of “crowding out”. That is, because the government could borrow money-capital in the market and pay whatever lenders demanded, the consequence, as the supply of money-capital fell, was that firms faced interest rates that precluded their own expansion. The increased liquidity/supply of money tokens and credit, in this period, did not lead to lower interest rates – precisely because money tokens are not money, and money is not money-capital – but led, instead, to rising commodity price inflation, as output failed to grow proportionate to the expansion of liquidity.