Engels returns to British political economy.
“Just as the bold stroke drawn through the years 1691 to 1752 removed all of Hume’s predecessors, so another stroke obliterated Sir James Steuart, who came between Hume and Adam Smith. There is not a syllable in Herr Dühring's “enterprise” on Steuart’s great work, which, apart from its historical importance, permanently enriched the domain of political economy.” (p 323)
Duhring uses past theorists in one of two ways.
“either as “pegs” of Herr Dühring's “authoritative” and deeper foundations, or, still more because of their badness, as a foil to him.” (p 323)
In relation to Steuart, he says nothing of his work, but falsely states that “he was “a professor” in Adam Smith’s time.” (p 323)
Steuart was not a professor but a large landowner in Scotland. Having been banished from Britain, he used his extensive travels in Europe to familiarise himself with the economic conditions there.
“Nevertheless, there are also a few heroes of political economy who represent not only the “pegs” of the “deeper foundations”, but the “principles” out of which these “foundations”, are not “developed” but actually “composed”, as prescribed in the natural philosophy - for example, the “ eminent and incomparable” List, who, puffed up the “more subtle” mercantilistic teachings of a Ferrier and others into “mightier” words for the benefit of German manufacturers”. (p 323-4)
The more the superficial nature of Duhring is considered, and his attraction to the likes of List, the more the image of Trump, also, comes into mind. List was one of those early advocates of economic nationalism, and protectionism, of the kind that, today, admires and appoints such as Peter Navarro.
Another theorist used by Duhring in this way is the American economist Carey, who wrote of Ricardo's system,
“the true manual of the demagogue, who seeks power by means of agrarianism, war, and plunder” (p 324)
Finally, in that category Engels cites Macleod, “the Confucius of the London City” (p 324)
Engels summarises what has been learned from Duhring's exposition, and concludes that it is nothing. As with Duhring's philosophy, we have a lot of big words, but very little illumination. Duhring's theory of value resulted in him putting forward five different, contradictory definitions of value.
“The “natural laws of all economics”, ushered in with such pomp, prove to be merely the worst kind of universally familiar platitudes, and often even these are wrongly grasped.” ( p 324-5)
His theory fails to explain how class society arises, and how one form of class society is replaced by another, just as his theory of Natural Philosophy was unable to explain how nothing becomes something, or how a condition of stasis becomes one of motion. In relation to exploitation, he can only resort to the claim that it is the product of force, but is unable to say how this condition of superior force is produced.
“Compelled to give further elucidations of the capitalist exploitation of labour, he first represents it in general as based on taxes and price surcharges, thus completely appropriating the Proudhonian “prior deduction” (prélèvement), and he then proceeds to explain this exploitation in particular by means of Marx’s theory of surplus-labour, surplus-product and surplus-value. In this way he manages to bring about a happy reconciliation of two totally contradictory outlooks, by copying down both without taking his breath.” (p 325)
That, of course, having first lambasted and lied about Marx's theories, just as, in relation to Philosophy, he vilified Hegel, before plagiarising him, and presenting a diluted version of his ideas. Throughout, Duhring shows a staggering lack of knowledge in relation to the things he writes about, even in relation to his own profession – Law. It displays a narrow Prussian parochialism. In history, his claim that it was the large landed proprietor that stands at the dawn of civilisation “is oblivious of the common ownership of land in the tribal and village communities, which is the real starting-point of all history — this ignorance, which is nowadays almost inconceivable, is well-nigh surpassed by that of the Kritische Geschichte, which immoderately glories in “the universal breadth of its historical survey”, and of which we have given only a few deterrent examples. In a word: first the colossal “input” of self-praise, of charlatan blasts on his own trumpet, of promises each surpassing the other; and then the “output” — exactly nil.” (p 325-6)