Of the billions paid into pension funds, each year, even the money that does go to buy shares or bonds, rather than line the pockets of the financial institutions, 70% of it goes to buy up existing shares and bonds, and so to simply inflate their prices, rather than financing additional, real capital investment/accumulation. That is the case with all transactions on the financial markets, which act primarily as casinos where the participants simply gamble on which stock or bond is going to race ahead, and which be left behind. As Marx put it,
“It reproduces a new financial aristocracy, a new variety of parasites in the shape of promoters, speculators and simply nominal directors; a whole system of swindling and cheating by means of corporation promotion, stock issuance, and stock speculation. It is private production without the control of private property.”
Marx saw no reason why the regular financial crises/crashes, as against the cyclical economic crises, resulting from an overproduction of capital, or an overproduction of commodities, should be a concern of the workers.
“As regards the fall in the purely nominal capital, State bonds, shares etc.—in so far as it does not lead to the bankruptcy of the state or of the share company, or to the complete stoppage of reproduction through undermining the credit of the industrial capitalists who hold such securities—it amounts only to the transfer of wealth from one hand to another and will, on the whole, act favourably upon reproduction, since the parvenus into whose hands these stocks or shares fall cheaply, are mostly more enterprising than their former owners.”(Theories Of Surplus Value, Part 2, p 496)
But, of course, now that the ruling-class is comprised entirely of such parvenus, and speculators, rather than industrial capitalists, and, because their entire wealth has become dependent on continually inflating asset/fictitious
capital nominal prices, it is no wonder that they use the state to ensure that condition persists, even where doing so, directly conflicts with the interests of real industrial capital. As Marx again put it,
"... the reduction of the money equivalents of these securities on the stock exchange list has nothing to do with the actual capital which they represent, but very much indeed with the solvency of their owners."(Capital III, Chapter 30)“Talk about centralisation! The credit system, which has its focus in the so-called national banks and the big money-lenders and usurers surrounding them, constitutes enormous centralisation, and gives to this class of parasites the fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner — and this gang knows nothing about production and has nothing to do with it. The Acts of 1844 and 1845 are proof of the growing power of these bandits, who are augmented by financiers and stock-jobbers.”(Capital III, Chapter 33)
In previous financial crises, such as 1847, 1857, 1929, the state, responded to the events, and threat to production, by ensuring that credit was available for commodity circulation. In 1847 and 1857, as Marx and Engels describe, the financial crash itself had been provoked by the bursting of an asset price bubble, inflated due to low interest rates caused by burgeoning profits, which resulted in the supply of additional money-capital growing faster than the demand for it. The bubble burst when bad bank legislation (The 1844 Bank Act) unnecessarily caused interest rates to rise, because the Bank of England, reduced currency supply, in response to an outflow of gold. The resulting credit crunch led to a sharp curtailment of trade. But, as Marx and Engels note the real nature of the crisis was revealed because, when the Bank of England suspended the Bank Act, so as to facilitate additional currency supply, the crisis ended.
“By such artificial intensification of demand for money accommodation, that is, for means of payment at the decisive moment, and the simultaneous restriction of the supply the Bank Act drives the rate of interest to a hitherto unknown height during a crisis. Hence, instead of eliminating crises, the Act, on the contrary, intensifies them to a point where either the entire industrial world must go to pieces, or else the Bank Act. Both on October 25, 1847, and on November 12, 1857, the crisis reached such a point; the government then lifted the restriction for the Bank in issuing notes by suspending the Act of 1844, and this sufficed in both cases to overcome the crisis.”
But, in all these cases, including 1929, although the state facilitated the credit required to end the credit crunch restricting commodity circulation, it did not bail-out the financial speculators who had lost. As Marx notes above, some lost, others gained. In 1929, those like John Templeton, who sold prior to the crash, and, then, ploughed money in after it, when assets could be bought for 10% of their pre-crash prices, gained enormously. In 2008, and after, the opposite has been the case, as central banks have bailed out the speculators, whilst imposing credit restrictions and financial austerity on the real economy.
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