Britain was drawn into the EEC/EU, precisely because of these objective laws of history and material conditions. The conditions which had enabled it to become the foremost mercantile power, replacing the Netherlands, in the 17th century, and to become the hegemonic industrial power, in the 19th century, a manifestation of that law of combined and uneven development, had dissipated by the 1970's. Indeed, for much of the twentieth century that process of relative decline was underway, and accelerating.
Although, the mythology, itself clung to by the petty-bourgeois nationalists, persists that it was Britain that won the war of 1939-45, the reality is far different. A resurgent German imperialism again sought to assert its leading role in the formation of a single European state, just as it had done in 1914-18. Indeed, despite all of the moralistic nonsense, about the 1939-45, European war, being about a fight of democracy against fascism, it was really just a continuation of the unresolved contradictions of the 1914-18 war. What is more, that resurgent German imperialism was not going to be stopped by a relatively declining British imperialism.
Sections of the British ruling-class knew it. Some sought to appease German imperialism, having already, in the 1920's, welcomed the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy, and, in the early 1930's, Hitler in Germany, as a means of quelling a rising working-class, and its bulwark, the USSR. It sought to divert the gaze of German imperialism East, towards war with the USSR, as it had done several times in the past. During the 1930's. It was just as likely that Britain might have allied with Nazi Germany against the USSR, as that it would ally with France, and later the USSR, against Germany.
Much to the chagrin of France, Britain agreed the Anglo-German, naval pact in 1935, enabling Nazi Germany to rebuild its navy beyond the limits set by the Versailles Treaty. Britain, still the dominant, but declining, power in Europe, undoubtedly saw a war between Germany and the USSR as to its advantage. That was not just for the reason set out above, especially with the prospect of Japanese imperialism nibbling at the USSR in the Pacific, following its advances in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, opening the possibility of a return to the wars of intervention that followed the 1917 Revolution. It would, also, drain German imperialism, in such a war, where it would bear the brunt of the fighting, giving British imperialism a breathing space, and the ability to continue to exploit its colonial empire for a while longer, largely unhindered.
Of course, that was not in France's interest. Nor, indeed, the longer term interest of Germany. In the era of imperialism, based on the creation of surplus value by industrial capital, as opposed to the era of colonialism, based on the realisation of profits from unequal exchange, the focus of capital shifts from the search for cheap primary products to pillage, and protected markets, to sell into, to the need to expand the size of the domestic market, to create multinational states. That was what European history had come down to in the century prior to WWII, and its necessity became all the greater, as the fundamental contradictions sharpened.
In the absence of an ability of the existing imperialist nation states in Europe being able to peacefully come together to create such a multinational European state, its creation, inevitably came down, again, to the continuation of politics by other means – the forcible creation of such a state under the dominance of the most powerful state. France, suffered from a similar weakness as Britain – a flabbiness that came from a long reliance on robbing its colonies via unequal exchange. Germany, which had few such colonies, had, from the start, to rely more on the development of its own large-scale industrial capital, and it was that which made it the most dynamic industrial power in Europe.
When World War came out of its phoney war stage, it was that, which enabled German imperialism to quickly dispose of the flabby old, colonial powers of France and Britain, rolling over France, in short order, and, likewise, expelling the British forces in the embarrassing defeat at Dunkirk, which, in turn, left Britain, isolated and effectively defeated, by 1940.
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