Every living thing grows, and so changes constantly from one thing/state to another. How is that possible without contradiction, without it being, simultaneously, itself and not itself? This is, again, the problem for the TSSI, which similarly rejects the contradiction implied in the fact that inputs are simultaneously outputs and vice versa.
“People who in other respects show a fair degree of common sense may regard this statement as having the same self-evident validity as the statement that a straight line cannot be a curve and a curve cannot be straight. But, regardless of all protests made by common sense, the differential calculus assumes that under certain circumstances straight lines and curves are nevertheless identical, and thus obtains results which common sense, by insisting on the absurdity of straight lines being identical with curves, can never attain.” (p 151)
As noted earlier, those that reject the dialectic and existence of contradiction and simultaneity, are forced to try to escape this contradiction, by defining the the point of tangency as a zero in space, a point that has no dimension, and so which does not, and cannot exist in the real world!
“True, so long as we consider things as at rest and lifeless, each one by itself, side by side and in succession, we do not run up against any contradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly common to, partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but which in this case are distributed among different objects and therefore contain no contradiction within them. Within the limits of this sphere of observation we can get along on the basis of the, usual metaphysical mode of thought. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions.” (p 152)
Again, this is the case with the approach of the TSSI, which makes the same errors as those of Ramsay, examined by Marx in Theories of Surplus Value, Chapter 22. If your approach is that of the individual producer, or of the accountant who divides reality into discrete periods of time, typically a year, in order to make rational calculations, and compare one discrete period/year with another, you will be able to get along fine within those limitations. But, such a superficial approach does not, at all, reflect the nature of real life, which does not break down into these discrete period, but is continuous, and so involves contradiction and simultaneity.
Ramsey noted that if a farmer produces corn, and the value of corn rises, during the year, they will, thereby, obtain a larger “profit”, at the end of the year than would otherwise have been the case. But, as Marx notes, the significance, here, is to first understand the nature of where this “profit” comes from.
“Whereas therefore Ricardo arbitrarily seeks to reduce the rate of profit to the rate of surplus-value in order to work out the theory of value consistently, Ramsay seeks to reduce surplus-value to profit. We shall see later that the way he describes the influence of the value of constant capital on the rate of profit is very inadequate, and even incorrect...
But if we only know that the profit depends on the ratio of the surplus to these outlays, then we can acquire the most inaccurate notions about the origin of this surplus, for example we can, like Ramsay, imagine that it originates in part in fixed (constant) capital.”
If we take the costs of production of the corn for the farmer – their historic cost – this has been paid, and can't be changed. If the value/price of corn rises, therefore, a greater “profit” is made apparent in the farmer's books for the year, and this larger profit, also, means a higher rate of profit, when measured against those historic cots of production. However, if accepted on this superficial basis, the Labour Theory of Value is destroyed.
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