But, even if we set all that aside, and assume a state of general equality and uniformity, Duhring is still left with the need to recognise that not all are equal. He says,
“There are also cases of “permissible dependence”, but these can be explained “on grounds which are to be sought not in the activity of the two wills as such, but in a third sphere, as for example in regard to children, in the inadequacy of their self-determination”.” (p 125)
Engels notes this as “Retreat No. 1” from Duhring's absolute and universal truth, in relation to the construction of a system of morals and laws. There are further such retreats. Duhring's second retreat starts from a peculiar argument relating to “beast” and “man”, in which individuals are a blend of the two in varying proportions. He says,
“Where beast and man are blended in one person the question may be asked, on behalf of a second, entirely human, person, whether his mode of action should be the same as if only human persons, so to speak, were confronting each other ... our hypothesis of two morally unequal persons, one of whom in some sense or other has something of the real beast in his character, is therefore the typical basic form for all relations which may come about in accordance with this difference, ... within and between groups of people”. (p 126)
This argument is particularly objectionable to us, today, because of its racist undertones. It is the basis of colonialism, and, as Engels described, is used by Duhring “to determine casuistically how far the human man can interfere with the bestial man, how far he may show distrust and employ stratagems and harsh, nay terrorist means, as well as deception against him, without himself deviating in any way from immutable morality.” (p 126)
Racists and colonialists, like Churchill, used it to justify the enslavement of millions across the Empire, to argue for machine-gunning, gassing and starving anyone who resisted. Of course, Churchill, also, viewed British workers such as the Welsh miners in Tonypandy, in not much higher regard.
“So, equality also ceases when two persons are “morally unequal”. But then it was surely not worth while to conjure up two completely equal people, for there are no two persons who are completely equal morally. — But the inequality is supposed to consist in this: that one person is human and the other has a streak of the beast in him.” (p 126)
Humans are animals, too, but are separated from the animal kingdom by the power to reason, and, thereby, to develop laws and morals, as well as to change the material conditions of their existence. The less developed the latter, the less able are humans to be truly human, and the more they are conditioned and constrained by their nature as animals. The basic animal instinct is to survive, procreate, eat, dominate. It is not some inherent difference in the morality of individuals, reflecting a difference in the genetic blend of beast and man, but the material conditions of existence that are determinant.
“Apart from the philosophy of reality, a division of mankind into two sharply differentiated groups, into human men and bestial men, into good and bad, sheep and goats, is only to be found in Christianity, which quite logically also has its judge of the universe to make the separation. But who is to be the judge of the universe in the philosophy of reality?” ( p 126-7)
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