Sunday, 30 August 2015

Capital III, Chapter 13 - Part 16

The proportion of value added by living labour in each individual commodity unit, and, therefore, the proportion of profit can rise, if productivity increases so as to reduce the value of the constant capital relative to the variable capital. This is particularly the case in relation to the fixed capital. If a new machine is introduced, which is twice as productive as existing machines, then, as set out in Capital I, the result is to cut the value of existing machines in half. Because the value of the machine is reduced by 50%, the amount of value it transfers to commodities, via wear and tear, is also thereby cut by 50%. For the new machine, because it is twice as productive as the old, the amount of value it transfers, via wear and tear, to each commodity unit is already half what the previous machine transferred.

As Marx set out in Chapter 6, this kind of change, for raw materials, tends to occur in step changes. It takes a prolonged period of high market prices before copper miners will commit to the cost of developing a new copper mine, or before new areas of land are opened up to new farms, as is happening now in Africa, as it happened, in the US, in the 19th century. But, when these new sources of supply do come on stream, their production costs are usually a fraction of those of existing producers. Moreover, it is frequently the case that the previous period of under-supply, which caused market prices to exceed prices of production, is then matched by periods of over-supply, when market prices undershoot prices of production.

“In no case does a fall in the price of any individual commodity by itself give a clue to the rate of profit. Everything depends on the magnitude of the total capital invested in its production.” (p 230)

The fall in the price may result from a fall in the value of the constant capital used in its production – either the fixed capital or the circulating capital. In that case, the fall in price would coincide not with a fall, but a rise in the rate of profit. The falling price may result from changes in productivity, so that a given amount of labour processes a larger quantity of material, so that although the material costs remain the same per unit of output, less is comprised of wages and profit. In that case, the rate of profit would fall.

“The phenomenon, springing from the nature of the capitalist mode of production, that increasing productivity of labour implies a drop in the price of the individual commodity, or of a certain mass of commodities, an increase in the number of commodities, a reduction in the mass of profit on the individual commodity and in the rate of profit on the aggregate of commodities, and an increase in the mass of profit on the total quantity of commodities — this phenomenon appears on the surface only in a reduction of the mass of profit on the individual commodity, a fall in its price, an increase in the mass of profit on the augmented total number of commodities produced by the total social capital or an individual capitalist. It then appears as if the capitalist adds less profit to the price of the individual commodity of his own free will, and makes up for it through the greater number of commodities he produces. This conception rests upon the notion of profit upon alienation, which, in its turn, is deduced from the conception of merchant capital.” (p 230-1)

Profit upon alienation is a term developed by Sir James Steuart,
and discussed by Marx in Theories of Surplus Value. It refers to the profit, particularly merchant capitalists obtain, from the sale of commodities, as opposed to the surplus value created in production. Specifically, it means the profit obtained from the selling of a commodity above its value. This notion of the source of profit developed by the Mercantilists, although it can explain why this or that capital obtains a profit, or a higher or lower profit, cannot explain the source of profit in general, for the reasons Marx sets out in Capital I, i.e. if every commodity owner sold their commodity at say 10% above its value, they rob each other by the same amount, so it would be the same as if they simply sold them at their value.

Yet, it seems to each capital that this is precisely what they do, i.e. they take their cost price and add a percentage for profit. How much they can add appears to be simply a question of the state of demand for the particular commodity, or their particular skill in reducing the cost price. It may also seem, as Marx says, that the ability to obtain a greater mass of profit arises from the decision to adopt a lower profit margin so as to maximise demand. The mass of profit then seems to be a function of multiplication, i.e. it is the profit margin multiplied by the quantity of units sold, whereas the reality is that it is a process of division. It is the mass of profit, which is divided by the units sold, which determines the profit margin on each unit.

In order to produce at the least cost, the capitalist must produce in the proportions determined by the technical composition of capital, and the technical constraints discussed in Capital I, in relation to the minimum size of capital. Given the available capital of each firm, this then determines the quantity they will produce. The produced surplus value will then be equal to the value of this level of output minus its cost of production. The surplus value per unit is then equal to this amount divided by the number of units.

But, each firm sees this reality reflected through the lens of competition. Having determined its optimum level of production, it must deal with the issue of demand, which continually fluctuates with consumer preferences. Its objective, therefore, is to realise as much of the produced surplus value as possible, within the constraints of that demand, by charging the highest price possible, compatible with selling all of its output.

In reality, therefore, this aspect of maximising profit has nothing to do with the skill of the individual capitalist. The conditions for producing at the most efficient, least cost level are technically determined, whilst the level of demand for the commodities is determined not by the producer but by the consumer.

“The fall in commodity-prices and the rise in the mass of profit on the augmented mass of these cheapened commodities is, in fact, but another expression for the law of the falling rate of profit attended by a simultaneously increasing mass of profit.” (p 231)

Marx also comments that the rise in productivity that results in this increase in the mass of commodities produced and a fall in their individual value, does not change the value of labour-power, and rate of surplus value, unless these commodities are wage goods. But, in reality, other than perhaps luxury goods, all commodities enter in some way into the production of wage goods. If the price of a machine falls, this is not itself a wage good, but, to the extent that the machine is used to produce wage goods, or even just to produce materials or fixed capital used in the production of wage goods, it thereby indirectly affects the price of wage goods.

Moreover, as Marx set out in the previous chapter, the market price of any commodity, under capitalism, is not determined in isolation from all other commodities, precisely because it is a function of its price of production, which depends upon the average rate of profit.

Those capitalists who operate with the latest technology and techniques, but which have not yet been widely adopted, as was seen in Capital I, are able to sell at a market price above their individual price of production, and thereby to obtain a profit above the average until such time as competition reduces it.

“During this equalisation period the second requisite, expansion of the invested capital, makes its appearance. According to the degree of this expansion the capitalist will be able to employ a part of his former labourers, actually perhaps all of them, or even more, under the new conditions, and hence to produce the same, or a greater, mass of profit.” (p 231)


Saturday, 29 August 2015

Friday, 28 August 2015

Friday Night Disco - Who's That Lady - The Isley Brothers

Capital III, Chapter 13 - Part 15

As Marx and Engels point out, the bourgeoisie calculate the rate of profit on the basis of the laid out capital, rather than the advanced capital, because this invariably produces a lower rate of profit. In the national accounts, of capitalist economies, the data is provided on the same basis, of the laid out capital, i.e. the cost prices, and so any calculation of the rate of profit also replicates this error, and grossly understates both the real annual rate of profit, and the rise in that rate resulting from the continual rise in the rate of turnover. Unfortunately, most calculations of the rate of profit, even by Marxist economists, are undertaken on this basis, and thereby replicate the error. (See:The Rates of Profit, Interest and Inflation)

Marx then makes another important point, in relation to the calculation of the rate of profit, which is that the rate of profit must be understood as a rate based on the advanced productive-capital. The rate of profit cannot be meaningfully understood on the basis of the money-capital, or the historic prices paid for the elements of productive-capital, because, for Marx, the rate of profit is nothing other than an index of the self-expansion of the productive-capital itself.

“The rate of profit must be calculated by measuring the mass of produced and realised surplus-value not only in relation to the consumed portion of capital reappearing in the commodities, but also to this part plus that portion of unconsumed but applied capital which continues to operate in production.” (p 229)

As productivity rises, the value of each individual commodity unit falls. It contains less labour, both materialised labour (constant capital) and living labour (variable capital plus surplus value). This is so even as the total mass of commodities produced, and so the total value of this mass, itself rises. But, profit is only a part of the new value added by living labour. If the amount of living labour in each commodity unit falls, then so does the amount of profit. This tendency is offset by the fact that the rate of exploitation rises, but only within limits. In other words, if the amount of value added by living labour in each unit falls from 5 minutes of labour-time (say £0.05) to 3 minutes of labour-time (£0.03) then the mount of profit per unit could still rise, if the rate of exploitation rises from 40% (£0.02 per unit) to 70% (£0.021 per unit).

But,

“In all these cases — which, however, in accordance with our assumption, presuppose an increase of constant capital as compared to variable, and an increase in the magnitude of total capital — the individual commodity contains a smaller mass of profit and the rate of profit falls even if calculated on the individual commodity. A given quantity of newly added labour materialises in a larger quantity of commodities.” (p 229)

But, as Marx points out, the mass of profit grows if more labour-power is employed, or if the same quantity is employed at a higher rate of surplus value. But, the process which leads to a higher organic composition of capital, is also the same process which sees the accumulation of capital. Although the value of the variable capital falls, relative to the constant capital, the absolute quantity of and value of the variable capital continues to expand. It is this fact which leads to the increase in the mass of profit, and the accumulation that flows from it.

This is particularly the case in respect of the total social capital. A particular capital may reach a stage where labour is replaced on such a scale that the quantity employed falls absolutely. But, the profits generated lead to the expansion of the total social capital, in other spheres, where additional labour-power is then employed. That is why it is frequently the case that even when unemployment is rising, employment, i.e. the actual number of people employed, is also rising, as part of the normal expansion of capital.

Thursday, 27 August 2015

Capital III, Chapter 13 - Part 14

Looking at the rate of profit at the level only of the individual commodity/industry, therefore, Marx says,

“Outside of a few cases (for instance, if the productiveness of labour uniformly cheapens all elements of the constant, and the variable, capital), the rate of profit will fall, in spite of the higher rate of surplus-value, 1) because even a larger unpaid portion of the smaller total amount of newly added labour is smaller than a smaller aliquot unpaid portion of the former larger amount and 2) because the higher composition of capital is expressed in the individual commodity by the fact that the portion of its value in which newly added labour is materialised decreases in relation to the portion of its value which represents raw and auxiliary material, and the wear and tear of fixed capital. This change in the proportion of the various component parts in the price of individual commodities, i.e., the decrease of that portion of the price in which newly added living labour is materialised, and the increase of that portion of it in which formerly materialised labour is represented, is the form which expresses the decrease of the variable in relation to the constant capital through the price of the individual commodities.” (p 226-7)

However, Marx points out that even at the level of the individual commodity, if we calculate the effect on the basis of the price of the commodity, we will again be led into error, because of the difference, demonstrated previously, of calculating the rate of profit on the laid-out capital rather than on the advanced capital. In other words, a failure to take into consideration the rate of turnover of capital, which itself must rise alongside the same causes that raise the organic composition.

The rate of profit that Marx is referring to here is s/c+v, which is the same as the profit margin, which can also be written as p/k, where p is the profit, and k is the cost of production. This is made clear by Marx in Theories of Surplus Value, Chapter 16, where he writes,

"{Incidentally, when speaking of the law of the falling rate of profit in the course of the development of capitalist production, we mean by profit, the total sum of surplus-value which is seized in the first place by the industrial capitalist, [irrespective of] how he may have to share this later with the money-lending capitalist (in the form of interest) and the landlord (in the form of rent). Thus here the rate of profit is equal to surplus-value divided by the capital outlay."

But, Marx and Engels specifically distinguish between the "capital outlay", and the capital advanced. The capital advanced, is the capital advanced for one turnover period, whereas the capital outlay is the total amount of capital laid-out during the year. As Engels describes in Capital III, Chapter IV, and as Marx himself refers to in Chapter 13, the rate of profit is calculated on the laid-out capital, whilst the real rate of profit, or annual rate of profit is calculated on the advanced capital. Two completely different figures and sets of conclusions arise from these different rates of profit, as will be demonstrated.

If the rate of profit is calculated on the basis of the cost-price of commodities, p/k, i.e. on the basis of the laid-out capital, for the year, then the rate of profit can only be the same as when calculated on the basis of the advanced capital if the advanced capital is only turned over once during the year. This is very unlikely. Moreover, the cause of the rise in the technical composition of capital, which brings about a rise in the organic composition of capital, is the rising social productivity of labour. But, it is that same rise in productivity which continually reduces both the production time and the circulation time of capital, thereby continually increasing the rate of turnover of capital, and the annual rate of profit along with it.

Engels gives three examples to demonstrate. In the first, a capital of £8,000 produces 5,000 pieces, sold at £1.50 each. The cost price of each piece is £1, leaving £0.50 as profit. The assumption Engels makes here is that the circulating capital is turned over just once during the year, so the laid out capital is £1 x 5,000 pieces = £5,000. If we calculate the rate of profit on this laid out capital, it is then equal to the profit (5,000 pieces x £0.50 = £2,500) divided by the laid out capital of £5,000. It is then 2500/5000 = 50%. But, the total advanced capital is not £5,000 but £8,000, presumably because, although Engels does not specify it, the firm employs a further £3,000 of fixed capital. If we calculate the rate of profit on the total advanced capital, it is then 2500/8000 = 31.25%.

In the second example, the capital rises to £10,000, and symptomatic of the rising social productivity of labour, the capital produces twice as many pieces – 10,000. The commodity has a cost price of £1, and is sold at £1.20 per piece giving a profit per piece of £0.20. The laid out capital is then 10,000 x £1 = £10,000, and the profit is 10,000 x £0.20 = £2,000. The rate of profit calculated on p/k is then 2000/10,000 = 20%. The total advanced capital, in this case, was also £10,000, and so the rate of profit, calculated p/C is also 20%.

In the final example, the total advanced capital is £15,000. Again reflecting the growing productivity of labour, this larger capital produces now 30,000 pieces in a year. The cost price per piece is £0.65, giving a total laid out capital for the year of £19,500. In other words, the laid out capital here is greater than the advanced capital, by £4,500. The reason for this is that the circulating capital turns over more than once during the year.

In other words, of the firm's £15,000 of capital, £10,000 may be in the form of fixed capital, with just £5,000 of circulating capital. It is only the circulating capital plus the wear and tear of the fixed capital that goes into the cost price of the commodity. In that case the laid out capital of £19,500 may represent approximately three turnovers of this advanced circulating capital.

The profit per piece is £0.10 which means the total profit is 30,000 x £0.10 = £3,000. The rate of profit calculated on the laid out capital is then 3000/19500 = 15.38%. But, calculated on the advanced capital of £15,000 3000/15000 = 20%.

In other words, the higher the rate of turnover of capital, the higher the annual rate of profit. But, we know that the same processes that lead to a higher technical composition of capital also result in this higher rate of turnover of capital, and therefore, a higher rate of profit. We know too as Marx sets out that these same processes lead to a relative reduction in the proportion of fixed capital to circulating constant capital because these processes mean that in addition to the devaluation of fixed capital, via moral depreciation, technological development means that one new machine replaces several older machines etc. As the proportion of fixed capital to circulating constant capital falls, so this gives a powerful boost to the rate of turnover of capital, and, therefore, to the rate of profit.

This reality is usually missed in calculations of changes in the rate of profit, because the rate is usually calculated on the basis of the laid out capital, p/k, rather than on the advanced capital, p/C, or more correctly s x n/C, where s is the surplus value for one turnover period, n is the number of turnovers during the year, and C is the advanced capital for one turnover period.

When this continuous increase in the rate of turnover of capital is taken into consideration, it can be seen why it acts as a necessary and powerful force leading to a rise in the annual rate of profit.

Wednesday, 26 August 2015

Central Banks Are Now Impotent

A lot of emphasis is being placed on the role of central banks in stopping the current financial market crashes, as well as in preventing economies sliding into recession. In reality, central banks have never been able to achieve the latter aim, and because they have acted to blow up the bubbles in property and financial markets, so many times in the past, that are now bursting, they have now put themselves in a position where they can no longer achieve that aim either. The air in their own tanks has been used up, so they have none left to puff more into those bubbles. It is a fact that the Governor of the Indian central bank, Raghuram Rajan, has pointed out in recent days.

In fact, it has been the action of central banks, over the last 30 years, in putting a floor under those financial and property markets – the so called Greenspan Put – that has created this condition. Conservative governments, particularly in the US and UK, sought to create an economic model based upon low wages and high private debt, with the latter being the other side of rapidly inflating asset prices, which in turn provided collateral for yet further borrowing. It was the model developed by Margaret Thatcher in Britain, and Ronald Reagan in the US.

Despite North Sea oil revnues, the deficit to GDP ratio
was much higher during the Thatcher/Major governments
than under the last Labour government, as Thatcher used
high levels of unemployment to smash the unions, and
thereby reduce wages.
In the UK, for example, at the same time that Thatcher used North Sea oil revenues to finance a massive rise in unemployment, so as to smash the unions, and workers' ability to resist pay cuts and job losses, she also deregulated financial markets so that banks and finance houses could lend without end, to people whose falling wages were increasingly going to be incapable of repaying the resulting debts. Whilst ordinary people's incomes were falling, they were deluded, by this policy, into believing that they were simultaneously becoming more wealthy, because the value, on paper, of their house was going through the roof, and if they had money in shares or bonds, they were going through the roof too – until, of course they didn't as in 1987 with the stock market crash, 1990 with the property market crash, 1994 another stock market crash, 2000 another stock market crash, 2007/8 another property market crash and 2008 yet another stock market crash.

But, the model required that these property and financial market crashes could not be allowed to do what they have always done in history, which is to clear away these bubbles, because that would prevent ordinary people from borrowing even more, going even further into debt, and without that, consumer demand, in economies that rely on high levels of consumer spending, would have collapsed. It would have meant that wages would have to rise, which would have undermined the model. In the UK, in the early 1980's, everyone had been encouraged by Thatcher to take on personal debt to buy their council house. Single people were given the idea that they must “get on the property ladder”, to accrue wealth out of thin air (unlike their parents who had lived at home with their parents, usually well into their 20's, and actually saved money, so as to be able to buy a house when they got married). They were missold pensions by Thatcher's newly deregulated financial services industry, and sold shares in the various privatisations and so on.

So, when in 1987, global stock markets crashed by more than 25% in a single day, this rather upset the scenario of ever rising wealth from nowhere that Thatcher and Reagan, and the other proponents of the magic of money, were trying to sell. Step into the picture, Alan Greenspan, newly minted Chairman of the US Federal Reserve. Greenspan was a devotee of Ayn Rand, and so also a proponent of “sound money” based on gold. Well, the US had already dismantled any connection of the dollar to gold – actually it should be gold to the dollar, because the price of gold had been fixed at $30, at Bretton Woods – in 1971, when Nixon, answered De Gaulle's requirement to have France's debts paid in gold, by removing dollar convertibility to gold, and making it illegal for US citizens to hold gold.

Greenspan, as the global capitalist system appeared to be disappearing down the plughole of the financial markets, ignored his commitment to “sound money”, and stepped in to slash interest rates, flood the economy with liquidity, and thereby brought the panic to a halt. In the following year, financial markets not only recovered the losses from the crash, but rose by 50%! It appeared that money magic could cure all ills after all, just as Milton Friedman and the Monetarists had claimed. It reinforced the idea that the economy could be tweaked using monetary levers, rather than the Keynesian fiscal levers that had been the orthodoxy from 1945-74.

But, rather like a game of whack-a-mole, having stopped the stock market crash by devaluing the currency, the consequence was, in Britain, to simply inflate another bubble. Between 1988-90, house prices more or less doubled. Then, in 1990, with inflation rising, and the UK also entering another recession, house prices crashed by 40%, taking them right back down to where they had been in 1988! Of course, hundreds of thousands of people who had bought at the top of the market, including tens of thousands, who had bought council houses, found they could not pay their mortgages, which had doubled, as mortgage rates rose, whilst they could not get back what they had overpaid for the house, because it was now worth only half what they had borrowed to pay for it! Tens of thousands of people were evicted, at a time when also Thatcher's policy had prevented the provision of alternative housing to accommodate them.

But, that set the scene for the period up to now. In 1994, as the Federal Reserve attempted to raise official interest rates, it sparked yet another stock market crash, as the price of bonds sold off, and interest rates spiked. In 2000, following the financial crisis in Asia and Russia, and with the potential for a further financial crisis, as a result of fears of the Millennium Bug, the Federal Reserve pumped yet more money tokens into circulation, which further fuelled the bubble in shares, particularly technology shares that had been running since 1995. The NASDAQ index, which had been rising by amounts of up to 70% a year, similar to the recent rise in the Shanghai Composite Index, fell in March 2000 by 75%. Fifteen years later, it briefly got back above its 2000 level, only to once again now fall back below it. So much for the idea, that shares or property always rise over the longer term. In fact, it was not until the mid 1950's, that US shares recovered the levels they had achieved prior to the 1929 stock market crash, and for most people that is too long a time-scale to have to wait, for it to do you any good.

Central banks have a role in providing liquidity into the economy to prevent a credit crunch similar to that which arose in 2008, or as Marx describes as happened in 1847 and 1857. But, that is all. They need to provide the currency required to enable the real economy to function, so that commodities can continue to circulate. But, they have no requirement to keep pumping liquidity into the economy to reflate crashed financial markets, and to the extent they do, they undermine both their own function, and the real economy. On the one hand, by reflating property and financial markets, they prevent the proper functioning of the market in clearing out excesses. There is clearly no rational basis for either stocks or property to be at the ludicrously high levels to which they have been pushed over the last 30 years.

That fact alone has meant that workers' housing and pension costs have been massively increased, which raises the value of labour-power, and cuts the rate of surplus value and profits. But, it also, as Haldane has noted, leads to a situation where the owners of fictitious capital are led to believe that this is a never ending upward spiral. Instead of money-capital being used to accumulate productive-capital, and thereby increase the mass of profits out of which interest payments can be made, it simply goes into fuelling ever more speculation, in the buying of existing financial assets at ever higher, and unsustainable prices. The two things are directly contradictory. The more money-capital goes into speculation, the less goes into accumulating real capital to produce the profits, which finance the payment of interest to justify the holding of fictitious capital! As Haldane puts it, “capital eats itself”.

QE was justified on the basis that it was needed to prevent global economies going into recession, but it could never have achieved that. The best it could do was to prevent a credit crunch sending the global economy into a recession. But, the amount of liquidity required for that, and the duration of such intervention, is very limited, whereas the extent of QE has been more or less unlimited. Had central banks allowed stock and property markets to crash in 1987, and not repeatedly intervened to reflate them, on every subsequent occasion, when they inflated, the current financial crisis would not have arisen.

That has been apparent in relation to the recent bubble in the Chinese markets, where there are numerous stories of individual producers who have diverted their available money-capital to stock market speculation that they would otherwise have used to expand their productive-capital. But, it is also visible in relation to major corporations, whose top directors over recent decades have focussed most of their attention on using profits for various forms of financial engineering to boost share prices, rather than in expanding the actual business.  That is because those directors are the representatives of fictitious capital not productive-capital.  They promote the interests of shareholders not the business itself.

QE could never prevent recessions, it could only act alongside Keynesian fiscal stimulus to increase the level of aggregate demand in the economy. In the 1980's and 90's, monetary policy and the encouragement of additional private debt acted to counter the drop in wages that Thatcher's economic model required, and the low productivity economy that followed from it. But, that was always going to be a time limited solution, because once the levels of private debt reached levels at which those individuals could no longer realistically either pay back the debt, or take on additional higher cost debt, the only answer is default. It is what has led on the one hand to the development of the large number of Pay Day lenders, and on the other to such a large number of people being in debt to them.

So, the policy of trying to promote aggregate demand by loose monetary policy and an encouragement of debt, alongside a policy of austerity, under current conditions, is bound to fail, and is failing. In fact, the growth that does exist in the global economy is despite rather than because of central bank and government policies. On the one hand policies of austerity take demand out of the economy, and cause uncertainty. On the other, monetary policy is encouraging speculation and draining money from productive investment, which would add both demand and capacity, provide jobs and income and profits.

What is more, not only is the monetary policy damaging real economic growth, but it is not now capable of even reflating financial bubbles. The Chinese central bank has cut official interest rates five times this year, but the Shanghai Composite continues to crash. The Federal Reserve and Bank of England have kept official interest rates on the floor, but the stock markets there also have continued to fall. What is more, even on the days that the central bankers announce that they will hold or cut official interest rates, the actual market rates of interest – the yields on bonds etc. – have been rising, which shows that the central bankers cannot dictate market prices.

The truth is that although China's economy is slowing down, it is still growing rapidly, and as Michael Roberts set out recently, those who are writing it off, are likely to be proved wrong as they have been several times in the past. Having said that, China does have several problems it needs to address. It needs to shift its economy more towards its own huge domestic market. To do that, it will need to do what every other developed capitalist economy has done, and create a welfare state. Industrialised capitalist economies require a welfare state, so that the workers do not engage in individual large scale savings to cover unemployment, ill-health, old age and so on. In that way, they can devote a larger portion of their wages to consumption. But, also industrialised economies need a welfare state, which acts as the provider of the quantity and quality of labour-power required by capital, at the least cost to it, and also acts as a large automatic stabiliser in the aggregate demand of the economy, avoiding the need for ad hoc interventions.

Global growth is not stellar, at the moment, for the reasons discussed above and in previous posts, but there is still growth. In the US, where the financial pundits continue to plead, on behalf of the speculators they represent, for the Federal Reserve not to raise interest rates, growth is still strong enough to suggest that the central bank is behind the curve and should have raised rates long ago, rather than holding off on raising them for even longer.

But, the reality is that, whatever the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the PBOC or any other central bank does, they have made themselves irrelevant. They have repeatedly blown up asset price bubbles when they collapsed over the last 30 years, and have spent up their firepower in doing so. With interest rates at zero, and their balance sheets blown up out of all rational proportion, they cannot now do anything to reflate property or stock markets, without risking hyper inflation. If central banks cannot now even suggest that they will raise official rates from zero to 0.25%, for fear that it will cause a stock market crash, then in reality, they may as well admit they can never raise official interest rates ever again, because with such extended bubbles, any rise in interest will always provoke such a crash, as Gary Kiminsky pointed out on Bloomberg yesterday.

So, as has happened in the past, and as the rise in bond yields over the last few days has shown, whatever central banks do, the market will ignore anyway. If the central bank does not raise rates, then the markets will do it for it, as the owners of money-capital begin to realise that the risk return has moved decidedly against them. That is really what is behind the current sell-off. The supply of money-capital is declining, whilst the demand for money-capital is rising, with the necessary effect that interest rates will rise. As Marx, Massie and Hume set out that cannot be changed by simply printing more money.

Yet, it is the latter that the central banks have essentially relied on as their only tool. But the tool is now blunted, it is a hammer trying to treat every problem as a nail.

Corbyn and Women Only Carriages

A lot of middle class opponents of Jeremy Corbyn seem to be getting very desperate to find some basis on which to attack him, and in the process only demonstrate the extent to which their middle class way of life separates them from ordinary working-people.  So, on the BBC Paper Review last night, Corbyn was attacked for proposing women only carriages at night on London Underground as a means of dealing in the short term with the rising problem of attacks on women on the tube.

The basis of the criticism was that by suggesting that women should have the benefit of their own carriages, it means making women the problem, not the attackers!  Really?  It seems to me to show a recognition that it is the attackers who are the problem, and that it is women who are the victims of the problem, and to provide an immediate practical solution to that problem.  The argument that was put that its necessary to deal with the attackers shows just how removed these middle class pundits, who probably never have to suffer that risk of attack are.

Of course, it would be great to be able to deal with the attackers, and indeed to deal with that aspect of human behaviour that leads to the attacks, but that hardly deals with the problem of women facing the attacks now does it.  Its the equivalent of the old response to every problem with the demand for "Socialism Now".  Its also the equivalent of the idea put forward by conservatives that the answer to teenage pregnancies is not to provide girls and boys with contraceptives, but to tell them not to have sex!

The idea that women should have their own compartments as a safe zone on tubes as a means of dealing with the current situation seems eminently sensible.  It is in fact no different from similar suggestions such as having "women only" shortlists for selection meetings and so on, to deal with the problems of sex discrimination against women.

But, then it seems the Blairites are so desperate now that they will pick anything to try to beat Corbyn with.