Engels, then, moves on to an important point touched on earlier. That is that, in speaking of negation, this does not mean the same things as cancellation, or setting to nought. If we go back to the line of computer code, the subroutine of which its part, might read something like
X = 1
Loop
X = X + 1
End Loop.
At which point, we have X = 2, so that, then, X = X + 1, results in X = 3, and so on. However, assume that we simply cancel X. We would then have:
X = 1
Loop
X = X – X
End Loop
So, now, X = 0, and X – X is also zero. There is no possibility of change. It would make no sense, because the whole point of the subroutine is to establish a dynamic based on certain initial conditions and parameters. Negating it by cancellation prevents any such dynamic, and means that X could be just set to zero in the first place. So, when the argument is raised that the negation of some initial condition should mean setting it to zero, that is just as absurd. Negation, here, does not mean setting to zero, but simply asserting that the initial condition is, simultaneously, something else, that A is also not A. Engels sets this out in terms of a dynamic resulting in some higher level, but, going back to the line of code, it could just as easily be X = X - 1. In some conditions, for example, surplus value might be negative, in which case, rather than capital self-expanding, it self-contracts (in other words the positive new value created by labour is less than the value of labour-power).
Marx's definition of capital, not as a thing, but a social relation between capital and labour, which appears contradictory, is based on precisely that. On the basis of formal logic, how can capital (X) be, simultaneously, a social relation between itself and something else Labour, (L)? It would mean that capital is both X and XL, at the same time. But, that is exactly what capital is, and this contradiction is one that exists in the real world. If we take the value of the commodities that comprise the elements of the productive-capital, i.e. c + v, they are equal to, say, X. But, the part of X represented by v, the variable capital, is equal to the wages of the labourers. Yet, those same labourers, in the process of production, create new value equal to v + s, so that the value of the capital is, now, no longer X, but is X + s. No additional commodities have been added to those of the original capital, so as to increase its value. The additional value comes solely from the new value created by labour, in the production process, in excess of the value of its wages.
Exactly what the size of this surplus value is also depends on the social relation, between capital and labour. It depends on the value of labour-power, which determines the wages of the labourers, the amount of necessary labour they must perform, and also on the length of the working day. In general, capital only employs labour-power where wages are less than the new value created by that labour. But, capitalists may miscalculate how much that new value may actually be. Alternatively, some unexpected event, such as a crop failure, or imposition of tariffs, might cause the value of labour-power to rise sharply. If, then, wages rise above the amount of new value created, instead of surplus value, there is a deficient value. Instead of capital self-expanding it self-contracts, which, with capital seeking to continue on the same scale, requires additional capital to be provided to cover the deficiency.
Such conditions might apply to individual capitals or to a large number for a limited time, but not for long. For capital in general, a similar condition may apply where the total amount of new value created is less than total wages, for example, where a large proportion of unproductive labour is employed. In these cases, the surplus value produced by productive labour is less than the wages paid to unproductive labour. This unproductive labour may be extremely important, but, as it does not produce surplus value, and does not exchange with capital, still drains the surplus value of society, and so prevents capital expansion overall, and, thereby, capital accumulation.
Similarly, as I have set out, elsewhere, in relation to Bukharin's The Economics of The Transition Period, it may be that labour is productive labour, does produce new value and surplus value, but is involved in large-scale projects, the value of which is not realised for many years, and so the surplus value produced is not realised. In that case, a process of expanded negative reproduction can take place.
So, Engels notes that, if someone says that a grain of barley is negated when it is ground into flour, an insect is negated if it is crushed under foot, and the positive quantity a is negated by setting it to zero, that is not what is meant by negation in relation to dialectics.
“I should not only negate, but also in turn sublate the negation. I must therefore set up the first negation in such a way that the second remains or becomes possible. In what way? According to the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, if I crush an insect, I have carried out the first act, but have made the second act impossible. Therefore, every kind of thing has its characteristic way of being negated, of being negated in such a way that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea.” (p 181)
The importance, here, should be obvious when we consider the nature of petty-bourgeois, moral socialism, in the form of “anti-capitalism”, or “anti-imperialism”. These trends seek to negate capitalism or imperialism, in the same way that the metaphysician sees negation, i.e. its cancelling to zero, or crushing under foot. It is an utterly nihilistic and reactionary concept of negation that offers no possibility of a progressive dynamic, in which capitalism/imperialism is not set to zero, but is sublated, becomes simultaneously, not capitalism/imperialism, as the global working-class asserts its own control over it.
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