UK second
quarter GDP rose 0.3%, on the first reading. That comes after just a
0.2% rise in the first quarter. I expect that the second quarter
reading will be revised down, and that in the second half of the
year, growth will slow further, or come to a standstill. The IMF the
other day revised down its growth
forecast for the UK to 1.7% for 2017.
I think that is highly optimistic. The fact is that the UK economy
has been living on borrowed time for several years. The growth has
been built on froth, as an already huge level of private debt, has
been recklessly expanded even further, simply to keep asset prices
inflated, and consumer spending going. The use of credit has acted
like elastic to stretch the ability of consumers to keep spending
beyond their limits, now the elastic is about to snap.
In the mid
2000's, as the UK economy, along with the global economy grew
rapidly, as the new
long wave boom got underway, wages began to rise
sharply, in a way they had not done for more than 20 years. In 2007,
oil tanker drivers won pay rises of 14% with not much of a fight; the
then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, appeared on
Sunday morning politics shows to implore workers to accept lower than
inflation pay rises, so as not to push up inflation further.
Plumbers and other craftsmen could not be found for love nor money,
as the construction boom exposed the lack of investment in skills
training, and the extent to which those previous skilled workers had
been lost to the economy, following the damage to it by Thatcher, in
the 1980's. It was why, the eponymous Polish plumbers were recruited
to make up these shortfalls, something that is being seen again now,
but in a different context, in relation to the shortage of nurses,
and other healthcare workers.
For the
previous 20 years, the stagnation phase of the global economy had
meant that labour-power was in excess supply. In the 1970's, and early
80's, it was capital that faced repeated crises of overproduction, as
rising wages squeezed profits, in the later 1980's, and through the
1990's, it was labour that faced repeated crises, as unemployment
rose, technology raised productivity replacing labour, even where
output expanded, causing wages to fall, and
the rate of surplus value
and of profit to rise. Falling wages from the late 1980's onwards,
posed a problem for capital in realising profits on the vastly
increased quantity of commodities that were being thrown on to the
market as a result of this new revolution in technology.
As I set out in my book, part of the answer to this was that the value of labour-power was
reduced as a result of this very same rise in productivity, and from
the cheapening of wage goods now produced in China, so lower nominal
wages did not result in a proportionate fall in living standards.
Part of the answer was that the vast quantity of commodities produced
in China, and sold in Britain, meant that part of the surplus value
produced by Chinese workers in production, was realised by British
workers, who now sold them as the number of retail and commercial
jobs increased. And finally, the answer came from the vast expansion
of private debt, as workers were encouraged to borrow on an
unprecedented scale, as Thatcher's government removed financial
regulations, and credit controls. This expansion of debt, often
collateralised against the property that some workers after WWII had
built up, meant that workers obtained the illusion of affluence,
whilst all the time being impoverished, as their assets/capital was
converted into
revenue. That happened also with the pension funds
they had built up over the previous half century, as pensions were
increasingly paid out, not from the revenue generated by the fund,
but from the illusory and ephemeral, paper capital gains that the
funds experienced as part of the blowing up of a series of asset
price bubbles.
In the early
2000's, the onset of the new boom meant that this period of falling
wages, and rising private debt could be brought to a halt. But, the
extent of the debt, and moreover, the extent to which asset price
bubbles had been repeatedly inflated – The Greenspan Put – posed
a problem for central banks and other policy makers.
The problem
faced by Keynesian orthodoxy in the 1970's had been that, in order to
halt recessions, increasing amounts of fiscal stimulus was required,
and increasingly, employers who saw that any respite would only be
temporary, began to use any uptick as an opportunity to raise their
prices rather than add to their capital. They raised their prices,
which meant that workers in a climate where labour supplies were
already stretched, obtained higher wages, so that the result was an
inflationary price-wage spiral. Monetarist orthodoxy now faced a
similar problem.
Monetarist
orthodoxy was that in order to stimulate economic activity additional
liquidity had to be put into the economy, that would then reduce
interest rates, and encourage additional borrowing, spending and
investment. The problem is that this theoretical standpoint is
bogus, for several reasons. Firstly, putting additional liquidity
into the system, does not reduce interest rates, unless there was
already a problem of inadequate liquidity, i.e. a credit crunch. All
that additional liquidity does is to devalue the currency, and
thereby create inflation. Secondly, even if interest rates did fall,
then as Keynes pointed out, unless businesses see some potential for
being able to sell any increased output, they will be unlikely to
accumulate additional capital, just on the back of lower interest
rates. The additional liquidity, he pointed out, would be like
“pushing on a string”.
What
capitalists are interested in is making additional profits, not
simply theoretical profits, but actually realised money profits, as
their commodities are sold. At a time when technological
developments were making labour relatively surplus, and wages were
falling, the rate of surplus value, the amount of profit that was
theoretically being squeezed out of workers, in production, was
rising, but the contradiction facing capital, was then how to realise
this profit, how to turn it into actual money profits, when those
very same workers formed a large part of the consumers for those same
commodities.
When a
supporter of Ricardo wrote describing such a situation that where
workers wages were reduced so that profits were raised, this
inevitably also led to a glut, Marx commented,
“This
is indeed the secret basis of glut.” (Theories of Surplus Value,
Part III)
The third
problem with the Monetarist solution was that having put additional
liquidity into the system, the authorities then had no control over
where it went. Some went simply into covering the increasing
importation of those wage goods that were now produced in China and
elsewhere, and sold in Britain, and the UK etc. It was one reason
that the trade deficits in these countries expanded hugely. But,
particularly during the 1990's, an increasing amount went into
financial speculation, again egged on by the deregulation of
financial markets undertaken in the UK and US in the late 1980's.
So, it is
often said that the vast increase in liquidity has not resulted in a
rise in inflation. But, it has. The inflation has been in asset
prices. The Dow Jones Index rose by 1300% between 1980 and 2000.
Similar rises can be seen in other stock markets. In 2008, the Dow
Jones along with other stock markets crashed, falling to around 7500,
but as yet more liquidity was pumped into the system, it rose from
the ashes again. It now stand at over 21,000, nearly treble its
level in 2008. It has risen by around 2100% since 1980, way in
excess of the nominal growth of the US economy, during that period, or
of the profits of US companies. And the same applies to the UK stock
market.
That huge
inflation of asset prices meant that in the 1990's, the paper value
of pension funds rose massively. On the one hand, that meant that
the contributions that workers and employers paid into those funds,
bought fewer and fewer shares and bonds, and so undermining the
capital base of the funds to generate revenues to cover future
pension payments. On the other, the paper capital gains gave the
illusion that the pension payments could simply be paid out of the
capital gains rather than revenues. In other words, pension payments
could be made by selling some of the shares and bonds in the fund,
whose prices had risen significantly. It also meant that employers
used this as an excuse not to make their own contributions into the
funds, during that period, which boosted their profits, and is why
pension funds today face huge black holes in their ability to meet
their commitments.
So,
increasingly, economies took on the form of a huge Ponzi Scheme,
where no real new revenue was being created, at least not in
proportion to the growth of asset prices, and revenue was being
created by destroying capital, whilst the appearance of capital
growth was being achieved simply by printing money, and encouraging
borrowing, and speculation in financial assets and property, which in
turn acted as collateral for yet further borrowing!
The problem
was that when in 2007, the working of the real economy began to
impinge on this dream world, as inflation began to rise, central
banks attempted to raise interest rates, and that exposed the extent
to which financial markets were simply floating in mid-air, supported
by nothing substantial. The epitome of that was the subprime
lending to the housing market, and the extent to which banks and
building societies had lent money way in excess of realistic property
values. Some banks collapsed across the globe, before central banks
and states intervened to bail them out, and thereby prevent a
collapse of those grossly inflated asset prices. Ironically, but
also typically, it was Labour's bailing out of those banks and other
assets that caused government borrowing to spike, but which has
subsequently enabled the Tories to pursue its policy of austerity,
based on the lie of Labour profligacy!
Central
banks and states succeeded in bailing out the banks, and reflating
asset prices, only at the cost of depressing real economic activity
over the last 8 years. It has distorted the current long wave
cycle, which is now likely to be extended as a result. But, now,
again, the real economy is asserting itself. Global growth has
continued to grind higher. Even allowing for the extent of hidden
unemployment, and underemployment in the UK, US and other economies,
we are approaching levels of full employment. The figures given in
the last couple of days of the inability to recruit nurses etc. are
an indication of the extent of the problem, but other reports have
shown that there is a shortage of around 75,000 lorry drivers,
shortages of construction workers also exist, and with Brexit
looming, not only are EU workers less likely to come to Britain, but
EU workers already here are likely to start to leave.
The Bank of
England, in particular, is in a bind. Brexit has already caused the
Pound to fall, and inflation thereby to rise. UK households are at
levels of debt now again comparable to those ahead of the financial
crash in 2008. A number of recent reports indicate the nature of the
problem, and how capital has stretched the elastic over recent years
in order to keep expanding.
A couple of
years ago, fears in the US were expressed over the size of subprime
loans in the car sector. In the last few years, that phenomenon has
appeared in Britain too. Today, very few new cars are actually
bought outright. The majority are leased. Some months ago, I
investigated the possibility of such a lease myself, only to find
that what it really is, is just a means of car companies and dealers
turning themselves into finance companies selling credit, as well as
cars. The salesmen tried to show me that I was virtually being given
free money, until I went through the figures with him to show that his conclusions were based on a series of false assumptions, and bad
maths, just to put the best interpretation on it, and an attempt to
deceive potential buyers to put a more accurate interpretation on it.
The other
example, in recent days, has been the disclosure that millions of
people were sold homes under a similar deception. Millions of people
have bought homes that were only leasehold without apparently
understanding the difference between leasehold and freehold. This
seems to open up the potential for billion pound claims against
solicitors who conducted the conveyancing of these homes, similar to
the PPI compensation claims that arose out of the similar misselling
ahead of the 2008 financial crash. The fact that millions of people
could buy homes that they didn't know were leasehold, or without
understanding the difference between leasehold and freehold is itself
a reflection of the economy that has been created on the back of easy
credit.
When I
bought my first house, I was 23, and my wife 20. We bought it
outright for cash having saved relentlessly for three years to do so.
That makes you a bit more attentive to how you spend your money, and
to make sure you do all due diligence before making any purchase.
But, over the last thirty years or so, a climate has been created
whereby no one saves money, no one buys things from their earnings,
and everything is bought without any great thought, simply by using
the easily available credit. When it appears that the things you buy
are paid for by money that magically appears from nowhere, it makes
you less inclined to spend time checking out all the details, even
though you could do it easily nowadays by spending 5 minutes googling
“leasehold”, rather than checking up the latest antics on Love
Island! You are even less likely to spend time doing due diligence
on your purchases, when, as now with leasehold properties, the
government comes along to offer to bail you out, at taxpayers
expense. The same is true with houses bought in floodplains and so on.
But, the
situation with leasehold is only a variation in the very policies
that governments themselves have pursued in recent years to try to
keep the property market inflated. Builders sold properties
leasehold, because in doing so, they could sell them cheaper than if
they were freehold. Like a car dealer leasing new cars, the builder
gets a chunk of money now, and further chunks of money in ground-rent
for ever more. It was a way of builders being able to sell more
houses at a time when the demand for houses was falling, as people
were already loaded up with too much student debt, credit card debt, car loan debt, store card debt, pay day loan shark debt and so on.
But, it is really no different in that sense than all of the shared
equity, and rent to buy scams that the government has also promoted
over the years to try to keep housing demand from collapsing, at a
time when real wages were still falling.
The Bank of
England needs to try to prop up the Pound by talking about raising
interest rates, because as the Pound continues to fall, inflation
will rise again, and with labour becoming scarce that will lead to
rising wages and squeezed profits, which is hardly a recipe for stock
markets to rise further. But, actually raising interest rates will
itself crash stock and bond markets, and send the housing market into
a sharp decline. They are at the end of the road, the elastic has
been stretched to the point of snapping, and Brexit means that
Britain will be ill prepared to deal with the consequences.