The Irish
government is just the last in a long line of pro-austerity
governments to fall. That process began where the contradictions
were most acute – in Greece. That process required a number of
iterations of one pro-austerity regime being replaced, by another
nominally less pro-austerity government, which then fell as it too
implemented austerity. When it came to the supposedly
social-democratic PASOK, it appeared to have reached its apotheosis.
The gutting of its support, led to a new term “de-pasokification”.
Since that time, one government after another that have occupied the
political centre-ground, as it has existed for the last thirty years,
has fallen. It indicates the lunacy of the Blairites, in their
various manifestations across Europe who want to continue to pretend
that nothing has changed, and to try to present those old failed
policies, as a route to success.
Of course,
the actual process in each country has been different. In Ireland,
much as in Britain, prior to 2015, the domination of politics took
the form of the two large pro-austerity parties, Fine Gael and Fianna
Fáil.
Unlike in Britain, the main division of these two parties goes back
to the divisions of the Irish Civil War after independence. As some
commentators have noted, this election, more than others has started
to configure Irish politics, more along that of other European
states, as one between Left and Right. The reason that the two main
parties are unlikely to form a grand coalition, has nothing to do
with any major ideological differences in relation to the economy.
As in
Britain, one party could pose as an austerity-lite version of the
other; as in Britain, that did little to attract voters to either;
even between the two main parties, they could not scrape a majority
of support between them. As in Britain, the main reason the two main
parties were able to hold on to the vote they did, is partly due to
inertia, and partly due to the fact that they faced no real credible
opposition, as others have been pointing out for several weeks.
In Britain,
the left for years has been impotent. Not only was it racked with
the sectarianism that pulled apart the workers movement from the
start of the 20th century, but even its most radical
manifestation amounted, for all of its rrrevolutionary verbiage, to
nothing more than statist, left-social-democracy, or Fabianism. At
its worst, it amounted to nothing more than sectarian party-building,
mixed with radical trades unionism. In Ireland, the largest of the
alternative parties – Sinn Fein – itself stands more in that same
Irish tradition of communalism than of European class based politics.
It only presented its own version of austerity-lite solutions, which
offered no real way forward for Irish workers. As for the rest,
despite the advantages they had over the British Left, because of the
Irish electoral system, they mirror the same problems of the British
sects, to which many are linked.
The
importance of the Irish election then, like many others across
Europe, lies not in the solutions it has provided, but in the
solutions it has rejected. The process of de-pasokification in
Greece, led to the election of Syriza, as the Greeks realised what
was becoming increasingly obvious, which was that austerity was not a
solution to economic problems, but was in fact, causing those
problems. In the period between 2000 and 2008, economic growth in
the EU was robust, as it was across the globe, as the new long wave
boom progressed through the Spring phase. Th economies of places
like Greece were flattered, because of the low interest rates which
flowed from the masses of loanable money-capital flooding into global
capital markets, as the rate and mass of profit soared, but also
because of the creation of the Eurozone.
That meant
that global economies were significantly divergent, as I have pointedout in the past.
On the one
hand there were dynamic, efficient economies like China that were
building up huge amounts of productive-capital, as well as
accumulating huge quantities of loanable money-capital. On the other
hand, there were economies like the UK and US, that were in relative
decline, that had seen significant de-industrialisation, and which
relied on being able to borrow from the surplus countries, such as
China to fund their continuing consumption, now of manufactured
commodities produced in China and other emerging economies. To add
to that bifurcation, within economies like the US and UK, there were
some new dynamic industries, but their economies had been shaped by
two decades of low wages, and cheap credit, which also fuelled the
development of a rentier economy, based on financial speculation on
stock, bond and property markets. That in turn, sucked in
speculative money-capital, from global money markets, and made the
financial services industry in those countries both into a major
foreign exchange earner, as well as an important employer within the
national economy, with a consequent effect on government tax
revenues.
In Europe,
that bifurcation was also fairly stark between a rich north, with
modern globally competitive industries, particularly in Germany, and
a poor South, which provided a market for northern produced goods,
and in return provided capital transfers to the north, in the shape
of increasing debt. In fact, Ireland was a partial exception to that
division. On the one hand, it suffered the same credit fuelled asset
price bubble as Greece, Spain and elsewhere, and yet the Irish
economy was one of the most modern in Europe, having built itself up
on the basis of new technology industries during the 1980's and 90's.
That, indeed is the reason that the Irish economy rebounded so
quickly, after the financial meltdown, and the Eurozone crisis of
2010.
Those
crises, were, in fact, financial crises of the kind seen before in
history. In previous times, such financial crises led to a major
write down of asset prices, and provided sufficient liquidity was
available to prevent a credit crunch curtailing economic activity,
they were generally beneficial, by clearing away large amounts of
debt. But, what has been peculiar about these financial crises, has
been that so many resources have been put into maintaining these
prices of fictitious capital, whilst at the same time, draining the
real economy of its lifeblood. The economy in Europe has been hit by
a policy driven double whammy of austerity to suck aggregate demand
out of the economy, and thereby discourage productive investment and
employment, whilst at the same time flooding that same economy with
huge amounts of liquidity, which was intended for no other purpose
than to reflate the already astronomical asset price bubbles, and
thereby to drain even more potential capital from productive
investment, in favour of short term, speculative capital gain.
The
resultant policy of extend and pretend, reached ludicrous
proportions, when everyone knew that an economy like Greece was being
crucified by such policies, that the debt was not going to be repaid,
and yet no one was allowed to suggest turning that widely held
knowledge into appropriate policy action. Instead, the Greeks were
told to keep doing what was already killing their economy, to keep
borrowing more money, not to invest, but simply to be able to repay
existing debt interest payments to the banks, so that more of those
banks did not go bust, on top of those that had already collapsed.
Yet, long after this obvious truth was virtually universally
accepted, when Syriza attempted to draw the obvious conclusions from
it, with the overwhelming backing of the Greek people, conservative
politicians across Europe, insisted they keep drinking the poison.
It is
partly, because of the ludicrousness of that, and because of the
strength of the conservative opposition to Syriza's social-democratic
alternative that they have so far retained the support of the Greek
people. There is a significant difference, as Lenin pointed out
between those politicians who genuinely seek to pursue one set of
policies, but who are forced by the balance of power to enter into a
compromise, and those for whom compromise is a way of life, and an
excuse to adopt the policies they supported all along. The real test
for Syriza lies not in the compromises it has so far been forced to
accept, but in how it uses the breathing space it has gained from
those compromises, now to link up with other social-democratic forces
across Europe, such as Podemos, the Left Bloc in Portugal, the
Corbynistas in Britain and so on to begin to change that balance of
power, and make possible a different set of solutions.
What the
Irish elections demonstrate again is that process of the collapse of
the political centre. It is based upon real changes in the global
economy. It is a process again represented by significant
bifurcations. A look on the surface shows yields on the sovereign
bonds of economies in Europe and North America at record low levels,
as loanable money-capital floods into them in search of a safe haven.
At the same time, yields on a range of high risk (junk) bonds, and
the insurance costs of protecting against default have risen sharply.
That also matches the problems some small businesses have in
obtaining money-capital at all, not to mention the astronomical
interest rates that many private households face for borrowing.
At the same
time, China which pumped trillions of dollars into global money
markets itself now has a debt to GDP ratio of more than 200%, with
its non-performing loans rising sharply. As its own asset prices
fall, and the Yuan depreciates, it faces the need to repatriate some
of its own money-capital. The same is true of all those rent based
economies in the gulf, and elsewhere, which poured loanable
money-capital into global capital markets from the revenues they
received from high primary product prices, pumped up by the huge
increase in global demand resulting from the onset of the long wave
boom after 1999. Now those economies, like Saudi Arabia, are
themselves having to become large scale borrowers of money-capital,
simply to cover their own expenditure.
All of that
is causing the demand for money-capital to rise relative to the
supply, and thereby pushing up the average rate of interest, which
thereby causes the prices of revenue producing assets to fall, as a
result of capitalisation. Hence the falls seen on global stock
markets over recent months. The strategy of the political centre,
for the last thirty years, was founded upon the idea that this paper
wealth could keep increasing for ever, simply by trading pieces of
worthless paper, at every higher prices. That dangerous illusion has
come to an end, and with it the basis of the political centre.
In Ireland,
as in Britain, the junior partner in the pro-austerity government got
crushed. Just as the Liberals have been wiped from the face of
British politics, so has Labour in Ireland. It demonstrates the
lunacy both of those who would have Labour link up with the Liberals
in Britain, and of the Blairites, who still want to pursue that same
austerity-lite agenda that saw the Liberals in Britain, and Labour in
Ireland get crushed! In reality, the UK election of 2015, was just
as much a part of that trend seen across Europe. It is being portrayed as a vindication of Tory policies, but the opposite is the truth.
The reality of the 2015 election is that a pro-austerity government
majority of around 80, was reduced to a majority of just 12. It saw
a slightly less pro-austerity Labour Party gain seats in England and
Wales, and increase its vote share faster than the Tories, and a more
vocally anti-austerity SNP, more or less sweep the board in Scotland.
The
challenge now is to provide the ideas and the strategy to replace
that of the old political centre. For socialists, that problem is in
some ways easier. For socialists, the task remains the same at all
times, to foster the independent development and self-government of
the working-class, and the expansion of worker-owned property, along
with the social relations that arise from it. But, that is a
long-term strategy. For now, socialists have to also give critical
support for social-democracy in its struggle against conservatism,
and that is a more difficult feat. It requires the overcoming of all
the national prejudices that social-democracy has itself fostered
over its history; it requires the forging of a new Europe wide
social-democracy.