Saturday, 10 February 2024

Chapter II, The Metaphysics of Political Economy, 3. Competition and Monopoly - Part 5 of 8

In opposition to the eternal category of competition, Proudhon sets up the category of monopoly, but there is no historical nor social context for these categories, or their logical development. His claim for the eternal nature of competition amounts to nothing more than a description of its ubiquity, within bourgeois production, and that where it does not exist, those industries are suffering a backward level of development, or are in decay. Proudhon says,

“Competition and association support each other. Far from excluding each other they are not even divergent. Whoever says competition already supposes a common aim. Competition is therefore not egoism, and the most deplorable error committed by socialism is to have regarded it as the overthrow of society.” (p 137)

As set out earlier, competition and cooperation/association certainly go together, but to imply from that they are the same is sophistry.

“Is it, then, by mere chance that the competition and association which the Socialists talk about are not even divergent?” (p 137)

Proudhon's claim that socialists regard competition as the overthrow of society is nonsense. As Marx sets out, in his Letter to Kugelmann, society takes many forms, in the process of human social development, and bourgeois society, based on commodity production and exchange, is just the latest of those forms. Competition is inherent to such a society, so how could it represent its overthrow?

“Socialists know well enough that present-day society is founded on competition. How could they accuse competition of overthrowing present-day society which they want to overthrow themselves? And how could they accuse competition of overthrowing the society to come, in which they see, on the contrary, the overthrow of competition?” (p 137)

Because Proudhon views economic categories, such as competition, monopoly and association as eternally fixed, he can provide no reality for them, a reality that involves change and interaction. So, feudalism arose in opposition to monarchy, not to competition, which did not exist. But, when it comes into existence, as commodity production, and exchange expands, does it not come into opposition to feudal monopoly? And, as capitalist production expands, the concentration and centralisation of capital again creates monopolies and cartels, trusts and so on that come into opposition to competition, and posit association and cooperation to it.

Marx sets out Proudhon's description of the “bad” side of competition that reflects his petty-bourgeois moralism and pessimism, reflected, today, in the ideas of the same trends in relation to their “anti-capitalism”, and “anti-imperialism”.

“Competition engenders misery, it foments civil war, it “changes natural zones,” mixes up nationalities, causes trouble in families, corrupts the public conscience, “subverts the notion of equity, of justice,” of morality, and what is worse, it destroys free, honest trade, and does not even give in exchange synthetic value, fixed, honest price. It disillusions everyone, even economists. It pushes things so far as to destroy its very self.” (p 138)

But, Marx notes,

“It must be carefully noted that competition always becomes the more destructive for bourgeois relations in proportion as it urges on a feverish creation of new productive forces, that is, of the material conditions of a new society. In this respect at least, the bad side of competition would have its good points.” (p 138)

Setting out the difference between the materialist and idealist method, Marx notes Proudhon's comment that competition is the result of the theory of the reduction of general expenses. That is like saying, Marx notes, that the circulation of the blood is a consequence of Harvey's theory.


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