The Political Situation (6/14)
In the period ahead, the conservatives will seek to develop large-scale capital, including the use of government spending on infrastructure etc., when required to do so, in the same way that Hitler developed the National Economic Council, and built autobahns etc. In the 1930's, in Britain, it was Oswald Mosely, when he was a Fabian Labour MP, and just before establishing his New Party, who put forward his Mosely Manifesto, supported by Nye Bevan amongst others, that was a Keynesian, 1930's equivalent of the Alternative Economic Strategy. They will do so whilst pressing down on the organised workers, the features of which can be seen in the measures proposed variously by Johnson in Britain, Orban in Hungary, and similar measures in Poland and elsewhere. In Britain, the conservatives erstwhile Brexit allies amongst the Libertarians will become their opponents, as they argue against this extension of the role of the corporatist state.
In order to understand this, its necessary to again consider the economic conjuncture. We are not in the same position that existed in the 1920's/30's, or the 1970's/80's. That is we are not at a stage in the long wave cycle where capital has proceeded to a stage where the social working-day cannot be expanded further, or where the rate of surplus value cannot be expanded. We are certainly not at a point where the accumulation of capital has resulted in the demand for labour reaching levels where the rate of surplus value is being seriously reduced by rising wages. In short, we are not facing a crisis of overproduction. There is, then, no current requirement for capital to address such a crisis via a restructuring of capital, a new technological revolution, and replacement of labour with fixed capital, over and above the usual gradual process by which that occurs (extensive accumulation rather than intensive accumulation). There is no requirement to resort to fascism or Bonapartism to achieve such a result. The problem that the dominant section of the ruling class, i.e. the top 0.01% that owns the fictitious capital, faces is quite different. It is how to avoid a repetition of the 2008 crisis, and, thereby, the destruction of its paper wealth. The problem is not the absence of plentiful opportunities to employ productive-capital very profitably, but the fact that, if it is, the more rapid economic growth does begin to cause wages to rise, and interest rates to rise, and the latter once more causes asset prices to crash, as happened in 2008.
There is something of a problem with expanding the social working-day, and, thereby, absolute surplus value, and that explains some of the current political situation. The problem is this. When the long wave uptrend began, the pace of economic expansion did cause a rapid increase in employment, particularly for some types of labour. There was a sharp increase in demand, in Britain, for example for skilled tradespeople, such as plumbers. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that, in the 1980's, Thatcher had got rid of apprenticeships, and of training for many of these skills. So, home-grown potential workers for these trades did not exist. Prices for plumbing work rose sharply, teachers began to retrain as plumbers, but the real answer was to simply import all those unemployed, and underemployed skilled workers from Eastern Europe that the collapse of Stalinism had created. In addition to these skilled workers, there was also a demand for unskilled workers to work in agricultural work, to work in social care and so on. Similar requirements for imported labour were seen across Europe, and in North America.
The free movement of labour is as vital for large-scale capital as the free movement of goods, services and capital. It is one reason it is led to drive towards ever larger single markets, like the EU. And, because it is vital for this large-scale capital, as a means of producing surplus value, and realising it as profits, it is also vital to the owners of fictitious-capital, whose interest/dividends are paid out of those profits. It is why the middle-class bureaucrats whose wages are dependent upon the success of this large-scale capital, and the shareholders, are both opponents of Brexit, along with the large majority of workers employed by this large-scale socialised capital. And, the same is true in North America in relation to NAFTA etc. However, the fact that this free movement of labour, across artificial, and, in essence, meaningless borders, within what have become single markets, is fodder for the propaganda of nationalist and fascist bigots, is a problem for this big socialised capital.
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