Khitarov continued,
“In Shanghai, at this time, the relations between the army and the workers became acute. It is known, for instance, that the army [that is, Chiang Kai-shek’s officers – L.T.] deliberately drove the workers into slaughter. The army for a period of several days stood at the gates of Shanghai and did not want to enter the city because they knew that the workers were battling against the Shantungese, and they wanted the workers to be bled in this struggle. They expected to enter later. Afterwards the army did enter Shanghai. But among these troops there was one division that sympathized with the workers – the First Division of the Canton army. The commander, Say-O, was in disfavour with Chiang Kai-shek, who knew about his sympathies for the mass movement, because this Say-O himself came from the ranks.” (p 269)
In fact, Say-O had gone to the Chinese Stalinists, and warned them of what was about to happen. A repetition of that occurred when Stalin's generals warned him that Hitler was preparing to invade Russia, in 1941. Stalin refused to heed the warning, or mobilise on the basis of it. When Hitler unleashed Operation Barbarossa, the USSR was unprepared, and quickly lost 25% of its territory, with Stalin suffering a mental breakdown, and disappearing for several weeks.
Rather as with the AWL's declaration that they know that imperialism and the capitalist nation state only acts in its own interests, and, yet, simultaneously proclaim that it defends workers' interests, to justify their apologism for NATO and Zelensky, and their subordination of workers to them, so the Chinese and Russian Stalinists made the same false argument.
“To all this, our responsible leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, Chen Duxiu included, declared that they knew about the coup being prepared, but that they did not want a premature conflict with Chiang Kai-shek. The First Division was let out of Shanghai, the city was occupied by the Second Division of Bai-Sung Gee and, two days later, the Shanghai workers were massacred.” (p 270)
Yet, after this catalogue of catastrophic blunders by the Stalinists, Stalin, at the Plenum of the ECCI, on May 24th 1927, could only refer to errors by the Opposition, which had warned against these dangers for the previous two years. In fact, as Trotsky says, at the time, they did not have the benefit of Khitarov's detailed account of just how favourable the conditions were for the communists, in Shanghai, prior to the coup, and yet they still managed to propose the correct course of action.
“Even from the deliberately concealed story of Khitarov it is clear that the situation could have been saved even at that time. The workers in Shanghai are in power. They are partly armed. There is all the possibility of arming them far more extensively. Chiang Kai-shek’s army is unreliable. There are sections of it where even the commanding staff is on the side of the workers. But everything and everyone is paralysed at the top. We must not prepare for the decisive struggle against Chiang Kai-shek, but for a triumphal reception to him. Because Stalin gave his categorical instructions from Moscow: not only do not resist the ally, Chiang Kai-shek, but on the contrary, show your loyalty to him. How? Lie down on your back and play dead.” (p 271-2)
Trotsky notes that, until this time, the Stalinists had praised the role of Tchen Duxiu, but that, as it became clear that he would not play the role of scapegoat for their blunders and betrayal that cost the revolution, they immediately turned on him.
“All the hounds of the Comintern were let loose upon him, not for mistakes fatal to the revolution but because he would not agree to deceive the workers and to be a cover for Stalin.” (p 272)
No comments:
Post a Comment