It is necessary to know what time of day it is, in formulating policy and strategy, and these adventurist positions were wholly damaging, in a counter-revolutionary period. But, the reason for their adoption was not entirely due to the incompetence of Stalinism and its desertion from Marxism. The policy also acted to distract attention from its failures, and to provide it with a superficial, revolutionary panache.
“Even though there was no revolutionary situation and the working masses were abandoning the Party, this Committee declared that the economic and social situation was, in its opinion, “favourable to the insurrection”. In any case, a triumphant uprising would have been very “favourable” to the prestige of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Given the fact that the workers were abandoning the revolution, it was therefore necessary to turn one’s back to the towns and endeavour to launch isolated uprisings in the villages.” (p 213)
The Opposition had correctly predicted that, in conditions of counter-revolution, arising from the earlier defeats, and, without any renewed activity by the masses themselves, the adventurist policy of organising isolated uprisings, would lead to further defeat and demoralisation. Stalin/Bukharin, and the ECCI, had described such predictions as “defeatist” and “liquidationist”, and, accordingly, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party followed suit. But, the Kiangsu Committee, whilst ensuring only to criticise the Chinese leaders, and not the ECCI, noted,
The Committee also noted, in relation to the Canton rebellion, that was supposed to be part of a coup, spreading across the whole of China,
“These measures flowed from a subjective estimation of the situation and did not correspond to the objective circumstances. Obviously, under such conditions defeats will be inevitable.” (p 214)
The ECCI, and the Chinese party had called for an end to putschism, but the fact was that the very theories and analysis of these bodies, of defining the period as one of permanent rise of the revolutionary wave, in which there were only short-term ebbs and flows, itself encouraged such putschism.
““But being given the fact that the Central Committee based itself in its estimation of the revolutionary movement, upon an uninterrupted advance,” as the Kiangsu resolution says correctly and pointedly,
“no modifications were brought into this question at the bottom. The forces of the enemy are far too greatly underrated and at the same time, no attention is paid to the fact that our organizations have lost contact with the masses. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the Central Committee had sent its information letter no.28 (on putschism) everywhere, it did not at the same time correct its mistakes.”” (p 214-5)
The Committee, again, only mentioned the Chinese party, but the ECCI also made no change in its analysis or policy, whilst simply warning against skirmishes, a warning, which, again, was designed only to cover its back, in relation to future defeats.
“... the resolution of this Plenum pounced furiously upon the Opposition which spoke of the necessity of a resolute change in the whole orientation. In February 1928, the course continued as before to lead towards insurrection. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party only served as a mechanism to transmit this instruction.” (p 215)
This set the tone for the future turn towards guerrilla warfare, as will be seen. On the one hand, the ECCI, and Russian party, via Pravda, made anodyne reports of the movements of Chinese communist guerrilla armies, but with no detailed background on what social forces were being mobilised, as the foundation of such actions. It meant that any victories could be reported and claimed, any defeat ignored or disowned.
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