Lenin notes that the most important conclusion from this part of the analysis is that the smallest difference in working season between Groups I and II, is in the first sub-group, i.e. the most developed enterprises producing directly for the market. It was only 1%, i.e. 10.1 months as against 10 months.
“in other words, It is the most prosperous handicraftsmen and the biggest and wealthiest agriculturists who are least diverted from agriculture. The difference is largest in the case of the artisans (second sub-group: 9.5 months and 10.4 months), that is, the industrialists and middle agriculturists least affected by commodity production. It would appear that the prosperous agriculturists are diverted so little from agriculture either because of their larger families or their greater exploitation of wage-labour in industry or their hiring of agricultural labourers, and that the artisans are most diverted from agriculture because they have been less differentiated as agriculturists, have retained patriarchal relations to a great extent, and work directly for agricultural customers who reduce their orders in the summer.” (p 401)
Further to the earlier observations about the higher living standards of the non-agricultural producers, Lenin says the census also shows the effect on literacy. The data did not provide information in relation to the wage labourers, but.
“It appears that the non-agricultural population is far more literate than the agricultural, and this feature is to be observed for both men and women in all sub-groups without exception.” (p 402)
Lenin notes that, in the non-agricultural population, literacy was spreading fastest amongst women. Lenin also notes that only one town was included in the data and that had other towns been included these differences would have been shown to be more pronounced than the data suggests. Lenin summarises the conclusions from this part of the analysis.
1) The link to agriculture preserves the most backward forms of industry, and holds back economic development.
2) It reduces earnings and incomes to the extent that even the agriculturist masters earn, on average, less than the least prosperous non-agriculturist wage workers, let alone the non-agriculturist masters.
This phenomenon is seen today with small petty-bourgeois producers and traders earning less than average industrial wages, working longer hours, and so on. It is one of the material conditions that leads to such layers being antagonistic to organised labour, and forming cannon fodder for fascists and right-wing populists.
“The masters of Group I have very low incomes even when compared with the wage-workers of that group—sometimes they are slightly higher and sometimes even lower than the workers’ wages.” (p 403)
Again, this applies today, where average industrial wages tend to put a floor beneath all wages, as the petty-bourgeoisie have to compete for available labour. Again, it is why this layer was so much in favour of Brexit, so as to undermine any civilised regulation of minimum wages and standards, and why they are so hostile to trades union organisation. At the same time, the introduction of in-work benefits, such as Universal Credit, Child Benefits, Housing Benefits, and so on, protects these petty-bourgeois employers, because it means that they can continue to pay low wages, compared to the average industrial wage, and have it subsidised by the state.
3) It retards the cultural development of the population.
Again this is seen today. The petty-bourgeois small producers and traders are frequently characterised by low levels of education and culture. The data on the education levels of those who voted for Brexit, as against those that opposed it, illustrates the point, and a similar division exists amongst those who voted for Trump as against those who voted for Clinton/Biden.
4) The same process of differentiation into bourgeois and proletarians, most evident amongst the non-agriculturists, was being replicated amongst the agriculturist producers.
5) The working season of the agricultural producers was less than that of the non-agricultural producers, but only by 5-20%, which could not explain the much larger differences in output, productivity and earnings.
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