US Shifting Alliances? - Part 3

Over recent weeks there seems to have been discernible shift, in US policy, of which the cooling of relations between Saudi and the US are a part. A number of factors seem to play into that. On CNBC a couple of days ago, legendary oilman, T. Boone Pickens, argued that the US pays a massive cost in the stationing of its fleet in the Gulf. It bears nearly all the cost, and yet, the US buys just 10% of the oil that is shipped through the Gulf of Hormuz. For several years now, Pickens has been advocating the “Pickens Plan” to get the US to invest in a conversion of its commercial vehicle fleet to gas, and thereby to make the US self-sufficient in energy, removing its dependence on the Gulf.

The fact, that “fracking” has reduced the price and, more importantly, increased the supply of oil and gas in the US, makes that idea more appealing. That may be part of a general more isolationist feeling that takes hold in the US periodically, especially when it has gone through a period of picking up the bills for being the global policeman. Yet, as stated above, that is not likely to be the real reason behind this shift, it shift it turns out to be. The cost of running a military machine that is bigger than that of the next several military powers combined, is considerable, especially at a time when the US is looking for ways to constrain its ballooning debt. But, it runs that machine for very real reasons that are no immediate in nature. Once global strategic positions are abandoned, they are much more costly to re-establish. It is less costly in blood and treasure to defend a bastion than to have to seize it.

Until recently, it seemed clear that the US was doing all it could to remove Assad, in order to open the door to Iran. Whether Assad used chemical weapons, or whether it was another manoeuvre to provide the pretext for military action is now moot. No such action is now likely. In fact, Assad's position seems strengthened as a result of the intervention of Russia, and the UN Weapons Inspectors. At the same time a change of Government in Ira, has opened the door to more friendly relations than has occurred for many years.

The fact that the US did not intervene openly in Syria, is probably the reason for the change in tone of Saudi Arabia, which seemed to be banking on such an intervention given that its proxies were appearing to be on the back foot, after Hezbollah fighters seemed more than a match for the tens of thousands of foreign jihadists that had swarmed into the country. If the US can come to some kind of modus vivendi with Iran that would give it a much less costly solution. After all, for decades, Iran under the Shah was the US's main strategic partner in the Gulf.

Such a modus vivendi may not suit Israel, but that may not immediately concern the US. Relations between Israel under Netanyahu, and the US under Obama have not been good. Netanyahu openly came out for Romney against Obama in the US election. Netanyahu is seen by the US as something of a maverick, whose hard line position has only made their task of stitching up deals in the region more difficult. But, despite Israel's public pronouncements, a deal with Iran may not be something they would oppose either. After all, they worked happily for decades with the Assad regime, and with the military in Egypt. In fact, to the extent some kind of Bonapartist state exerts control suppressing the jihadist forces in countries around its borders, the safer Israel is. Apart from Turkey, Israel could probably defeat any of its neighbours in a conventional war, but the kind of large scale insurgency that there has been in Syria, carried on within Israel would not only make life intolerable, but would ruin its economy.

So, its possible that in the short term, the greater room for manoeuvre the US has as a result of its new found oil and gas wealth gives it a better bargaining position against Saudi Arabia, whilst the change of government in Iran opens the door for negotiations that play off one potential strategic partner against another. In that respect the US would be doing nothing different than it did before WWI and WWII, in weighing up which side gave it greatest strategic and economic advantage.

After all, the US must be aware that the Gulf States in in financing, arming and training the jihadists, and finding them their recruits through the global network of madrassas, ultimately pose a threat to the US itself. Moreover, if Iran were disposed of as a global power, the Gulf States would have no need themselves of US protection. In fact, their historic protector – Turkey – is standing in the wings with an increasingly sectarian government wrapping itself in the clothes of Neo-Ottomanism. Its army is already the second largest behind the US in NATO, and its economy has been growing rapidly in recent years. The last thing the US would want to do would be deal with one sub-imperialism, only to open the door to an actual, and more powerful imperialism, especially one with one foot in the door of Europe, and whose history was closely enmeshed with that of European conflict.

Back To Part 2