The
consequence of that is that money has to go somewhere, especially
when more money is being printed. So long as profits continue to
rise, even modestly, which they are, then, especially in an
inflationary environment, shares continue to be an attractive home
for all that money. The point is, that without additional productive
investment i.e. actually diverting money into buying more machines,
materials, hiring additional labour-power, the money that goes into
stock markets, simply goes into buying the existing shares. In other
words, not a lot of new shares get issued to finance productive
investment. So, the money goes from one investor to another to buy
existing shares, pushing the prices up in the process. The same
process has pushed up bond prices in those countries, and for those
companies seen as safe havens. In part, what makes it possible is
the fact that large amounts of profits continue to be made from
existing productive capacity, in part what makes it possible is the
continual, and huge amounts of money printing by Central Banks.
So, within
the Eurozone, German Bunds, French OATS etc. have risen in price,
whilst the prices of Bonds in other Eurozone economies have fallen.
In the case of the periphery fallen sharply. Whenever, some new
announcement or promise of some new announcement is made the prices
of Bonds in the latter rise, and of the former fall, because of hope
that the additional money might find its way into resolving the
problems of the periphery.
So, at the
end of last year, with the Yields on Spanish and Italian Bonds
rising sharply, the ECB announced its Long Term Refinancing
Operation, through which it lends money to Eurozone Banks for three
years at low interest rates. Immediately, the prices of Spanish and
Italian Bonds rose sharply, whilst the prices of German Bunds, fell,
in the hope that it would enable Spain and Italy to get out of their
problems. The benefit was short lived, and at the beginning of this
year, the ECB announced LTRO 2. Once again the prices of Spanish and
Italian bonds rallied. But, once again the benefit was short lived,
as markets simply took the opportunity to sell into that rally,
leaving the Spanish and Italian Banks to pick up their own
Governments' bonds, financed out of the cheap LTRO funds they had
borrowed from the ECB. In other words, as with Greece, it was a
process whereby international Money Capital was able to get out of
these risky bonds, and transfer the risk back, in the first instance
to national banks, and then ultimately, as these are bailed out, on
to the books of the State, or quasi state bodies such as the ECB.
The ECB via LTRO bought up €1.1 Trillion of Spanish and Italian
debt. The same methods were used in the 1990's during the Asian
Currency Crisis, when IMF funding similarly allowed Money Capital to
sell their assets in those countries, and get their debts paid,
before the countries themselves were left to pick up the bill.
But, LTRO
II, was no more successful at dealing with the underlying problem
than QEII had been in the US. Two years ago, I wrote -
Why QE II Is Sunk
– which set out why such money printing could not resolve the
problems of the US economy, so long as the influence of the Tea Part
Taliban, prevented it being combined with fiscal stimulus.
“In other words in 2008
the situation was one in which there was a demand for money that was
not being satisfied, and which could only be satisfied if Central
Banks stepped in to fulfil their function as lenders of last resort.
But, the problem today is not one of an unsatisfied demand for money.
On the contrary, as I wrote recently the globe is awash with money.
Microsoft has just borrowed several billion dollars even though it
has nearly $50 billion of cash, simply because it can do so at
ridiculously low interest rates. The problem today is not an
unsatisfied demand for money requiring more Supply, it is, on the
contrary, a problem of lack of demand for all of the money
available.”
Of
course, in the end its not just a matter of providing a fiscal
stimulus to create a demand for that money – though as Martin Wolf
of the FT said on Newsnight recently, even that would be beneficial.
The real underlying problem facing Capital in the West, is a lack of
competitiveness, based on a disproportion of Capital allocation,
which can only be remedied via a significant restructuring. In other
words, Capital in the US, UK and the Eurozone cannot compete in areas
of mass production, such as car production, consumer goods production
and so on, with China, other parts of Asia, Latin America, and
increasingly Africa. Production of those things in the former
countries can only continue on the basis of a lower rate of profit,
or some form of protectionism. However, these former countries do
have a competitive advantage when it comes to high value production,
which can be high-tech production, or high quality production (for
example, Mercedes cars), or even the products of highly skilled
workers – luxury production, high end media, and entertainment etc.
The
US is something of a special case, because it also has a huge and
competitive agricultural industry. But, the US has also developed
these latter high-end, high value industries. The problem is it has
not developed them enough compared to its continued reliance on old
style manufacturing, and services. As an example, however, of the
importance of these new high value areas, its estimated that the new
Apple iPhone 5 alone, will add 0.5% to US GDP in the next year.
Clearly, some Capitals are continuing to invest, but as is always the
point it is a question of where quantity turns into quality.
Companies like Apple, Microsoft etc. have large numbers of highly
skilled and educated workers continually working on such
developments. This is the means by which these companies increase
their revenues and profits, rather than simply an investment in more
machines, more materials to produce an increased number of the same
product, which is the way old style manufacturing worked. In fact,
much of the actual production of iphones, iPads and so on is done in
China. But, in general Capital will not invest in increased capacity
where the future market for that capacity is uncertain. In the US,
at the moment, the likelihood is that Obama will win the election.
But, it is not clear who will have a majority in Congress. If
Republicans, especially Tea Party influenced Republicans, have a
majority, then the realities of the US Constitution mean that Obama
could be hamstrung in trying to push through policies of fiscal
expansion, just as he has been over the last two years.
In
that case, whoever becomes President, the issue of the “Fiscal
Cliff” presents itself. As part of resolving the issue over the US
Debt Ceiling, it was agreed that measures to reduce the deficit would
be put in place, and as part of the negotiations over this, it was
agreed that if no compromise could be reached a series of tax rises,
and spending cuts would automatically be implemented in January 2013.
The Republicans have refused to agree to any tax rises on the rich,
and as a result the automatic lapsing of existing tax concessions,
along with the implementation of Budget Cuts are due to be
introduced, unless some last minute deal is agreed. As with the Debt
Ceiling Crisis, everyone knows that a deal has to be done, but the
Republicans are refusing to do one, and are instead demanding that
the Democrats effectively just roll over. In fact, the Republicans
proposals are little better than what will happen without a deal
anyway. In return for agreeing to tax concessions for workers, they
insist on retaining tax concessions for the rich introduced by George
Bush. Instead they want increased reliance on Budget Cuts, which
will hurt the very poorest in the US, as well as the removal of some
of the reforms introduced in healthcare by Obama.
The
combination of tax rises and budget cuts amount to around $560
billion, and it is estimated that it would reduce US GDP by four
percentage points in 2013 alone, sending the US into an outright
recession. With that kind of uncertainty, combined with the
uncertainty generated by the Eurozone Debt Crisis, combined with the
effects of a global cyclical slow down, its no wonder that Capital is
reluctant to invest on any grand scale, which then becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Against that backdrop, the announcement of
QEIII by Ben Bernanke last week, seems rather trivial. In fact,
under QEIII, the Federal Reserve will buy up $40 billion of mortgage
backed securities each month, for as long as it deems necessary to
reduce unemployment on a sustained basis, even into an economic
recovery, and despite any consequence for rising inflation. But, in
fact, this amount is only half the $75 billion a month that the
Federal Reserve printed under QEII.
As
with every other announcement of money printing, stock markets
soared, whilst the Bonds of safe havens fell, and those of more risky
countries rose. But, it is likely to be short lived, and possibly
more short lived than with all the other similar announcements. When
I was a kid, I suffered very badly with asthma, and had pneumonia
twice, at a time when the only anti-biotic was penicillin. During
those two bouts, I struggled to breathe for about two weeks.
Fortunately, the first asthma inhalers were being introduced, which
basically used adrenalin. But, you could only use them once an hour.
As the time for the next dose arrived, I experienced sense of relief
on the basis of the expectation. The medication itself brought a
real sense of relief, as my lungs relaxed. But, within about ten
minutes or so, the effect had worn off. Then, in fact, things got
worse, because you immediately think, “I've had the medication, and
it hasn't helped”. The next dose seems a long way off. I suspect
that the markets will have a similar reaction to the last dose of
adrenalin provided by the Federal Reserve and ECB. But, the point is
now after several years of such medication, when it fails to work
this time, the markets are likely to begin to ask “Well what now?”
When
I was 16, I was given a new asthma inhaler. As I understood the
instructions from the doctor, I could use it whenever it was needed.
A new paradigm you might say. Not long after I had it, I felt ill
and began to use it, in that way. But, after a while, I began to
feel worse not better. My parents called the doctor, who said I'd
almost killed myself through an overdose of adrenalin, and my heart
was beating way too fast. I had to spend about 12 hours overnight
sitting on a straight backed chair, not moving, to allow it to work
out of my system. I suspect that the answer to the markets question
might end up being something similar.
Either,
the huge amount of money printing that has been done will need to be
diluted by diverting it into real economic activity, into investment
in productive assets, into infrastructure and so on, and thereby
create real Value in the economy, or else the markets having asked
“What next?”, and finding no adequate reply is returned will
crash, followed by a long period of economic inactivity.
As
I set out recently, the ECB proposals for OMT, that is buying up the
bonds of Spain and Italy will not resolve the economic problems of
those economies, and the Eurozone periphery. In fact, by sterilising
the money they use to do that, by taking it out of the system,
elsewhere, they are likely to simply cause a restriction on credit,
and slowdown of economic activity elsewhere, simply adding to the
economic slowdown of Europe caused by the recession in the periphery.
Moreover, on the back of the announcement of the OMT, the bonds of
Spain and Italy rallied, which then caused the Spanish Prime Minister
to announce that, on that basis, he saw no need to apply for a
bail-out!!
Yet,
the reality of the Spanish economy is worse than the superficial
appearance would suggest – and that is bad enough. It is not just
that much of the Spanish economy is not globally competitive, that it
suffers as - Paul Mason
– has described, from corruption, or that it has Depression levels
of unemployment, a rapidly falling GDP, and a million and a half
empty houses. It is that on top of all this, which makes it more
difficult to resolve, the country has huge amounts of hidden debt
that are not accounted for in the bail-out proposals. Spain's
Federal system means that each region has huge amounts of debt, which
ultimately the central government will have to pick up. We are just
seeing those regions begin to demand funds from the government, but
as has been the case throughout this debt crisis, the final amounts
required are likely to be much more than the opening salvoes. But,
much more significant is the masses of essentially worthless property
that the banks have lent money against.
I
was in Spain in April/May this year looking for a house to buy.
Prices have undoubtedly fallen. The places we were looking at were
around half what the asking prices were a couple of years ago –
though selling prices back then were at a considerable discount to
asking prices. Yet, even at these lower prices, prices are hardly
cheap in Spain. Even compared with the hugely inflated prices of
houses in Britain, house prices in Spain are not cheap, and compared
with the price of houses now in the US or Ireland, they are still
positively astronomical. Yet, even were Spain not essentially
suffering a Depression, property prices in Spain should be
considerably lower than in the UK. It is a big country with lots of
available land. In the last ten years, lots of marginal farmers have
sold land that should be extremely cheap, for building purposes. If
builders have overpaid for it, it is only because the bubbly property
market led them to believe they could pass on the overpayment to
buyers. Spain is only thirty years past being essentially a Third
World economy under Franco, wages in Spain are low compared to the
UK, so the cost of building property should be lower than here too.
Yet, property prices have been bid up by cheap money to hugely
unrealistic levels, and as is always the case when people have
overpaid for an investment those who made the mistake are loathe to
accept it, and to take the necessary loss. So, sellers continue to
hold out for prices they are never going to get.
The
likelihood is that the result of that will be an avalanche of
defaults, forced sales, and losses for the banks. That is why the
Bad Bank is being proposed. But, all the calculations of how big a
bail-out will need to be, are based on wholly unrealistic valuations
for that property. My guess is that the total of bad debt on Spanish
property will be many times what is currently being estimated,and
even under the current ECB proposals that debt will have to be
channelled through the Spanish State. My guess is that the funds
available through the ESM, EFSF and OMT will not be sufficient to
cover it. My guess, also is that when the markets begin to realise
that, and do their own calculations rather than believe the fairy
stories put out in respect of the Bank Stress tests, they will panic
and begin to once more sell Spanish Bonds, wholesale. Already, as
Paul Mason points out, €98 billion left Spain's banking system in
May and June alone.
And,
as I pointed out recently, even if the ECB/EU allows Spain to take a
bail-out with milder conditions attached to it than those imposed on
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, I'm not at all convinced that now just
lighter conditions will cut it. Recession and stagnation are
becoming entrenched, and to reverse it will require fiscal stimulus
not just milder fiscal contraction. Paul writes,
“But
right now I am pretty sure how it ends. The tell-tale signs are the
briefing notes from the perennial pessimists among analysts, warning
of "longer-term problems unresolved".
When I
receive such notes I become pretty sure that the short-term problems
are being resolved.”
That may be
right, but I think the time period between long-term, and short term
may have become considerably compressed. Short-term may well be what
crisis is resolved for this week, whereas long-term is what crisis do
we think is going to emerge next month? Already we know that Spain
has to borrow €30 billion from the markets before the end of
October. It needs to borrow a lot more than that in the next few
months. The ECB has agreed to buy Spanish debt, but only short
duration debt up to three years. But, for stability, countries need
to borrow over much longer maturities between 10 and 30 years. Spain
might find considerable difficulty still in doing that, and borrowing
at shorter dated maturities may simply increase its overall borrowing
costs.
In short,
the continued reliance on Monetarism to rescue the financial system
has come to the end of the road. The recent announcements smack of
desperation. But, I agree with a statement Paul made on Newsnight on
Thursday describing the events in the five years after the collapse
of Northern Rock. What we have seen has been more fiasco and
political mistakes than a Crisis of Capitalism.
ECCL is another one to add to the list of acronyms...
ReplyDeleteEnhanced Conditions Credit Line is the conditionality for the OMT sterilised bond buying programme - a euphemism for imposed austerity.
Graham,
ReplyDeleteYes, but I tend to agree with Paul Mason that there is an attempt to make those conditions less onerous than those that were imposed on Greece etc. My point, in response as I said, is that what is required from the perspective of Capital - and short of the revolution by workers too - is not lighter conditions, but a fiscal stimulus.
However, thinking as a politican and someone who has been involved in negotiating, I sense something else going on. If there is going to be a United States of Europe - this would apply to a Workers Europe too - individual states DO have to give up control of their budgets. You can't have a centralised state, responsible for financing, which lacks control over the individual states. You can see the problem of that in Spain now.
As part of the gradual bureaucratic move towards such a Federal State, nation states have to have that levered out of their grip, and the people of those states have to agree to it, as being in their immediate interests.
When you have done that, a centralised State can then exercise control not just for austerity measures, but for fiscally expansive measures too, directing money towards investment rather than construction, for example. Were I Germany - which has done lots of spending of money in other countries in E. & C. Europe for investment - I would definitely want to have control over money I gave to Greece, Spain, Portugal etc. to ensure it went into investment rather than into the pockets of corrupt politicians and bureaucrats in the way Paul Mason describes.
I still see the short run cycle turning up next year, which will create slightly better conditions, unless markets have lost patience, which I think is likely, and may indeed cause the "October Crash" I referred to earlier.
In short a crisis created out of political incompetence, not just over the last two years, but over the last 20 years or more of bureaucratic European construction.
That should have said towards investment rather than consumption.
ReplyDelete