Class War Erupts in Iraq

The Background

About a year ago I argued that the US policy in Iraq was emerging. That policy was for the division of Iraq into three – the Shia South, the Sunni Centre and the Kurdish North. Whether this division would result in three separate states, three states within the context of an Iraqi Federation, or the attachment of the South and centre to other states was not clear, though this latter was probably not in the US interest. Such a solution was probably the best hope of avoiding a prolonged Civil War that would not only prevent Iraqi oil from flowing freely on to the world market, but had the potential to spill over into neighbouring states threatening the US’s long term strategic interest, and its links to its main Sunni allies in the region in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Emirates. The main oil reserves in Iraq are in the Kurdish North and the Shia South though according to reports a few months ago large natural gas deposits have been discovered in the Iraqi Western desert. Iraqi Kurdistan is effectively already a separate state. With little violence in the area, and effective administration it has been developing rapidly over the last few years. The South also was not a hotspot for sectarian violence being overwhelmingly Shia. The main violence in the area was from Shia insurgents with the support of Iran targeting British forces, which was bound to subside as soon as those forces withdrew as they have now done. The main source of sectarian violence was within the Sunni triangle, and particularly Baghdad with intermingled Sunni and Shia populations. Although, these populations have historically co-existed and intermarried the US occupation as with most other colonialist regimes encouraged division between them as part of a policy of divide and rule.

This policy might have been intended to allow a bourgeois secular force to emerge under US military tutelage, but it clearly was counterproductive. Instead it led to increasing destabilisation. If Iraq was to be effectively divided into three then the issue of the Sunni Triangle had to be dealt with. With no oil wealth in the region the Sunnis would inevitably kick up about Iraqi oil wealth being retained in the oil producing regions. That problem was effectively assuaged by a promise by the US’s rich Sunni client regimes to bank-roll the Iraqi Sunnis, and an open commitment to intervene in any attempt by Iraqi Shia to overrun the Sunnis. But the second problem was that Baghdad was divided between the Sunnis, and a large Shia minority, a minority that was under the influence of Sadr. If a Sunni state was to be established the question of this large Shia minority in Baghdad would have to be addressed, or continuing sectarian violence would threaten to blow the whole scheme apart.

I suggested at the time that it was likely that the US troop surge would focus on attacking Sadr’s forces in Baghdad under cover of a general assault on insurgents, and that such a policy would be sold to the Shia politicians in the South on the basis of at the same time weakening their main Shia rival. Why would they accede? Because those Shia politicians represent the Iraqi bourgeoisie such as it is, whereas Sadr represents the poor, workers and peasants. His forces, in the absence of a strong Labour Movement, are the Jacobins. Historically, it is the Jacobins, precisely because they are based objectively on these social forces that represent the most extreme Left-Wing, that push the revolution forward, but, and for that reason are ultimately crushed by the forces of the bourgeoisie, unless like the Bolsheviks they are sufficiently well organised and draw behind them sufficient class forces.

In the intervening period the US surge attempted to draw out Sadr’s forces, but Sadr responded by playing dead. His forces under cover of ceasefire strengthened themselves in the South. Despite provocations, probably under US tutelage, against Shia in Baghdad, Sadr’s forces maintained their discipline rather thn get drawn into an open fire fight with the US. At the same time following intense diplomatic manoeuvres by the US with the surrounding Sunni states, and the signing of new deals, the provision of new weapons systems for Saudia etc. the US made a settlement with Sunni forces who were provided with arms and money for their militia in return for clearing out Al Qaeda whose politics also represented a threat to those Sunni leaders. Behind large concrete walls separating the Sunni and Shia communities the Sunni militia were built up by the US, while the main Shia militia of Sadr was subdued.

Class War

The final piece of that plan is now unfolding the final subjugation of Sadr’s forces as the government sets out effectively to disarm Sadr and his Jacobins. The current conflict in the Shia South is presented variously as being the actions of a constitutionally elected Government dealing with unconstitutional and illegal militia, or more intelligently and honestly of the forces of SCIRI dealing with the Mehdi Army through its influence in the Iraqi Government, and army, in other words as a sectarian/religious conflict within the ranks of the Shia. But the outbreak of what could be a serious Civil War within the Shia is no more at root about religious differences than was the English Civil War. That is merely a superficial veneer. The conflict is a social conflict between the forces of the Shia bourgeoisie tied in some degree to Iran, and the Sadrist Jacobins who whilst having some relations with Iran are far more nationalist in orientation.

But if this is essentially the outbreak of class war how should Iraqi socialists, and the Iraqi Labour Movement respond? Unfortunately, the weakness of those forces limits their options. What is clear is that the Iraqi Labour Movement has more in common with the social forces that back Sadr than they do with those backing the Government. The Labour Movement has to find a way of relating to those forces without in any way giving political support to Sadr, and his clerical-fascist movement. In the aftermath of WWI and the success of the Russian Revolution revolutionary Marxists, convinced that World Revolution was at hand, established Communist Parties as separate organisations to the existing Workers Parties. They expected that workers would flock to these new parties given the collapse of the Second International. Many did, though only in Germany was a party established that was anything like the Bolsheviks that had mass support amongst the workers. In France and Italy the existing Socialist Parties changed their names, but little else, and became wracked with division and splits. By the early 20’s it was becoming clear that not only was the European revolution postponed, but the Communist Parties were not winning the battle of democracy, were not winning the majority of workers to their banner. They remained attached to the old Socialist Parties in large measure. The Communist International developed the policy of the United Front.

The United Front

Trotsky outlined the idea in a number of speeches and articles. The policy was essentially developed for France, but was applicable to other countries with similar conditions. Trotsky points out that where the Communist Party already has the crushing majority of workers already supporting it there is no need for the United Front. The Communist Party simply develops its Programme and acts upon it. Similarly, where the Communist Party is very small – and Trotsky here was talking about parties of less than 200,000 or so compared to the sects of today that number in the hundreds not thousands – then likewise the United Front was not applicable, because the Communist Party would effectively not have the bargaining power with the forces of the bourgeois workers parties. Where, however, neither the Socialists nor the Communists had such a crushing majority of support the United Front was applicable. The idea was simple. The Communists say to the Socialists, look you do not accept the idea of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, you are not prepared to struggle for the Revolution, you remain tied to the bourgeoisie. On that we will continue to disagree. However, as representatives of workers there are things which affect workers here and now on which we can agree. We both agree on the need to defend wages, to defend the 8 hour day and so on. We propose to you on these specific issues to form a United workers front against the bourgeoisie. To the extent that the bourgeois workers parties agreed to such a struggle workers would become stronger and more mobilised, and the Communists would benefit. To the extent that the bourgeois workers parties refused such an approach they would be exposed in the eyes of the workers as defenders not of the workers but of the bourgeoisie.

Could the Iraqi Labour Movement propose such a United Front to the Sadrists? There are clearly problems. Although, the bourgeois workers parties were tied to the bourgeoisie there is a clear difference between them and the clerical-fascist politics of the Sadrists. Yet the principle is effectively the same. The tactic is not to make an alliance with the leaders of such a movement, not to give any credibility to their reactionary politics, but to find a route to the masses that support them, and thereby to break them away. There is no essential difference here in proposing such a United Front to fight for specific economic demands than for Communists to propose a common struggle over a wage claim with a Catholic Trade Union. Sadr’s social politics are determined by his religious beliefs, but his economic politics have to be responsive to the objective reality of his social base. In addition to the military response to the attack against his forces, Sadr’s other first response was to call for a General Strike.

The Iraqi labour movement has to find a route to that social base whilst continuing a relentless struggle against Sadr’s politics. The weakness of that Labour Movement limits its options, but a proposal for a United Front to fight for a Programme of economic demands might well at the present time be possible. Unemployment in Iraq is sky-high, inflation is high too. This presses heavily on the weakest sections of Iraqi society, and is probably one of the reasons support for Sadr has increased. It is thought that in the upcoming elections Sadr’s supporters might win a majority, which is why the Iraqi bourgeoisie is now taking the option of open warfare. There are a number of economic demands that could key into this situation.

A Programme of Class Struggle

Iraqi oil is in state hands. This is preferable to it being in the hands of private owners, but it is not ideal from the perspective of the Iraqi Labour Movement. It means that the revenues are absorbed by the Iraqi bourgeois state, and its US sponsor. There is no reason why this state should use these revenues to benefit the Iraqi masses. On the contrary they are likely to both enrich the Iraqi bourgeoisie and the foreign companies gorging themselves in Iraq, and to build up the forces of that state to further repress the Iraqi masses. Yet the vast resources of the Iraqi oilfields in the Shia South provide the basis for a programme of economic reconstruction that could give work to the unemployed, and considerably improve the living conditions of people in the area. The US and its clients have proved themselves, over the last five years, not only incapable of such a programme, but have manifested the most vile corruption. Only Iraqi workers have the motivation, and ability to bring about such a transformation.

In proposing a United Front the Iraqi Labour Movement should propose to the Sadrists the introduction of Workers Control in the oil industry. This should ensure that oil revenues are diverted directly by the workers to essential Public Works, and Job Creation schemes. In order to administer such funds, and to develop the necessary programme of Public Works it is necessary that neighbourhood committees be established to draw up a list of work that needs to be done, that brings together and organises unemployed workers with the necessary skills to undertake this work. It requires the establishment of co-operative enterprises to produce necessary materials etc. for the completion of such Public Works, and the establishment of Workers Control in the larger enterprises engaged in such supply. It requires the establishment of factory committees that organise all the workers whether they be Sadrist, socialist or non-aligned, Trade Unionist or non-Trade Unionist to struggle for the establishment of such Workers Control, and to oversee it once established. It requires the establishment of Peasant Committees linked to the Factory Committees and Neighbourhood Committees to organise the provision of food and other supplies to the towns. It requires the establishment of Workers Militia to defend such actions against the inevitable attacks of Government and Occupation forces, of the attempts by rival militia and criminal gangs to steal from the workers and peasants. In addition it requires the establishment of monitoring committees to check prices, and to develop a workers cost of living index against which workers should seek compensating increases in wages through the establishment of a sliding scale. There are undoubtedly many other such economic elements of a Programme that could be developed by workers in Iraq.

The point is that these demands provide the basis for making an appeal to the Sadrists for such a United Front. The condition would have to be that the Iraqi Labour Movement and socialist organisations maintained a strict political and organisational separation, that it was made clear that no concession would be made to Sadr’s reactionary politics including physical confrontation on the street to defend women and gays from attacks by clerical-fascist gangs be they attached to Sadr or anyone else. Would Sadr respond? Maybe not. Rather as Trotsky pointed out in the 1920’s a small communist party is in no position to effectively bargain with a larger organisation. But, unlike the situation of communist forces which simply have to recognise their weakness and work within the confines of a bourgeois workers party, and Trade Unions, the Iraqi Labour Movement cannot simply integrate itself into Sadr’s movement. But there is a precedent, and its is that of Italy under Mussolini. There Trotsky advised that the Communists had to find a way through such methods of creating a route through to the poor, and the working masses that had been drawn into giving support for the fascists, and thereby to exploit the necessary contradiction between that social base, and the objective historical function of fascism.

"The dispersed condition of the Italian proletariat precludes for our Italian comrades the possibility of their posing as an immediate task the overthrow of fascism by force of arms. While carefully preparaing the elements for the future armed struggle, the Italian Communists must, to begin with, develop the struggle through broad political channels. Thier immediate and preparatory task, which is, moreover, a tsak of enormous importance, is to begin to disintegrate the plebeian and especially the working class sector of fascist support and to fuse together ever broader proletarian masses under the partial and general slogans of defence and offence. By means of a dynamic and flexible policy the Italian Communists can accelerate in the extreme the downfall of the fascists...."

TRotsky - "Political Perspectives" from "The First Five Years of the Communist International Vol.II p298

If Sadr were to agree a powerful social movement could be created to mobilise around such economic demands, and to mobilise in a way that places no faith in the Iraqi bourgeois state. Within the context of such a struggle the Iraqi working class would be strengthened, and the Labour Movement would be likely to benefit from that proportionately more than would Sadr. If Sadr refuses the Labour Movement loses nothing but is able to use such rejection to propagandise to the workers and peasants about the nature of Sadr’s vacillation in defending their interests.

Iraq, the US and Iran

If the US does want, and succeeds in bringing about a division of Iraq, if it does so by marginalising Sadr’s forces through the medium of the Iraqi state and the influence within it of SCIRI, which is closely tied to Iran, what does this tell us about the US’s longer term plans, and its relationship to Iran? At first glance, the US position appears contradictory. On the one hand a victory for SCIRI, and the establishment on some basis of a Shia state in the South plays into the hands of Iran who would effectively be master of such a state, were it not even to seek incorporation. This contradicts US strategic interest in the region, which is to ensure that Iran’s influence is minimised as a possible rival to US interests. Whether Iran can be classified as “sub-imperialist” is debatable. The difference between imperialism and colonialism is this; colonialism is the expansion of merchant capital into foreign territory. It is driven not by any objective necessity, but from subjective motives, be they the greed of the merchant and the ruling class to which they are attached, or an assessment of political, strategic interest, for instance against the possibility of attack, the cutting of of trade routes etc. Imperialism, however, arises from the objective neccessit of economic relations. It arises when Capital has exhausted the potential within its national boundaries of profitably exploiting Labour Power, and is forced to seek Labour Power oversees to exploit.

Within that context it is difficult to describe Iran as “imperialist” or even “sub-imperialist”. Inside Iran there is considerable unemployment, economic growth is slow to non-existent. There remains considerable scope within Iran for the profitable employment of Capital without the need to seek such opportunities outside its boundaries. Iran has made considerable investment in Afghanistan on its borders, but this investment, largely in infrastructure appears more to do with trying to build social stability, and political influence on its border than a necessary drive of Capital to expand. If Iran can be described as anything it is expansionist rather than imperialist. Even then its expansionism, where it is not directly defensive and strategic, rather like that of Stalinism appears more to do with gaining political influence, of winning support for its world view, than any desire to gain economically, for instance in its support for Hamas, and Hezbollah.

Yet even such expansionism poses a threat to US global ambitions. The US requires of not compliant regimes in the region, at least regimes that are either docile, or else too weak to pose a threat to its influence, and its main strategic requirement – a stable and reliable supply of (preferably cheap) oil to the world market. A victory for Iran’s clients in Iraq is contradictory to that aim, but it is a necessary and unavoidable contradiction. The US would clearly prefer a secular, pliable, bourgeois client in Iraq, but its expectations that such a figure might emerge were quickly thwarted. It has to proceed with what it has, and hope that it can achieve its aims in the longer term, possibly if SCIRI and the Sadrists exhaust themselves – rather as SPECTRE tried to play off Russia and the US in order to seek world domination in James Bond films. In addition with US and British forces out of Southern Iraq there is no possibility of an attack on such forces there in response to an attack by the US on Iran. Such an attack that removed the Iranian leadership and led to chaos and weakness in Iran would undermine at the same time SCIRI in Iraq, and open up the possibility of some strongman/men emerging with whom the US could do business by the back door.

The response of the Bush administration to its own Intelligence Assessment of Iran a few months ago is illustrative. The Administration effectively dismissed the Assessment that Iran had ceased trying to build a nuclear bomb. It emphasised the fact that it had BEEN trying to build one, and that the assessment didn’t say it wouldn’t again try. In addition the US has emphasised the role of Iran in Iraq providing itself with another pretext for an attack. With oil now at over $100 a barrel, and forecasts that it might rise in the next year to $200 a barrel the US cannot afford to allow Iran to emerge as a powerful player in the Region. It will be forced to act. The question is when. The likelihood remains that Bush will try to save his record by a successful attack on Iran to remove the regime without making any promises in advance to bring democracy as it did in Iraq. It will settle for chaos and weakness. The initial response will be a spike in oil prices, but at today’s elevated levels such a spike is likely to be less pronounced. Moreover, the reduced threat to its other clients in the region who are by far more important suppliers may take out some of the risk premium from the price.

What is clear is that whether such an attack takes place on Bushes watch or that of whichever of his successors is in office, such an attack – short of the Iranian regime falling by other methods – is inevitable.